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 I.  INTRODUCTION  
Development is a function of good government.1 For this reason, or 
in spite of it, since the rise of new states in Africa (un-snugly 
superimposed on the numerous old societies in the region)2 nearly sixty 
years ago,3 there has been a recurring debate regarding the appropriate 
                                                          
1.  See Kemal Daviş, Good Governance and Economic Performance, Op-Ed, 
BROOKINGS (Mar. 13, 2014), https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/good-governance-
and-economic-performance/ (“It is the nature of governance that determines whether 
people deploy their talents and energy in pursuit of innovation, production, and job 
creation, or in rent seeking and lobbying for political protection.”); Barack Obama, 
Remarks by the President to the Ghanaian Parliament, WHITE HOUSE (July 11, 2009), 
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-ghanaian-
parliament (stating that “[d]evelopment depends on good governance.”). For 
definition of development, see infra notes 92-99 and accompanying text.  
2. See generally OLD SOCIETIES AND NEW STATES: THE QUEST FOR MODERNITY 
IN ASIA AND AFRICA (Clifford Geertz, ed., 1963). 
3.  This is counting from the Gold Coast’s independence as Ghana on March 6, 
1957. Ghana was the first country in Sub-Saharan Africa to become independent. 
Idara Sunday Ikoh, Ghana Independence 1957, WEB CHRONOLOGY PROJECT (2016), 
http://www.thenagain.info/WebChron/Africa/Ghana.html. For more extended 
analysis, see F.M. BOURRET, GHANA: THE ROAD TO INDEPENDENCE, 1919-57 (1960). 
Other countries soon followed. In 1960, famously called the year of Africa’s 
independence, 17 countries achieved independence. 1960: The Year of Independence, 
FRANCE24 (Feb. 16, 2010), http://www.france24.com/en/20100214-1960-year-
independence. These countries included Senegal, one of the two countries here under 
examination. These countries, in the order of their independence, were: Cameroon 
(Jan. 1); Togo (Apr. 27); Madagascar (June 26); Democratic Republic of the Congo, 
later Zaïre (June 30); Somalia (July 1); Benin (Aug. 1); Niger (Aug. 3); Upper Volta, 
later Burkina Faso (Aug. 5); Ivory Coast, later Côte d’Ivoire (Aug. 7); Chad (Aug. 
11); Central African Republic (Aug. 13); Republic of the Congo (Aug. 15); Gabon 
(Aug. 17); Senegal (Aug. 20); Mali (Sept. 22); Nigeria (Oct. 1); and Mauritania (Nov. 
28). Id. Senegal and Mali (then French Soudan) were previously granted 
independence on Jan. 17, 1959, as Federation of Mali, but the union was short-lived. 
Id. It was not until 1965 that The Gambia, the other of the two countries here under 
examination, won its own independence. And not until 1994 before black majority 
rule took place in South Africa, the last bastion of colonialism in the continent. More 
discussion on Senegal and The Gambia is included in Part II, the historical 
background of this paper. For brevity, this Article dispenses with formal practice by 
henceforth referring to The Gambia as simply “Gambia,” except when quoting other 
writers, whether in the text or footnotes.  
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political system4 for the pursuit of African development.5  Because of 
the artificial boundaries European colonizers bequeathed to Africa,6 the 
continent has more landlocked countries—fifteen of them to be exact—
than any other region in the world.7 Related to this impediment, several 
                                                          
4.  A political system is the set of legal institutions that constitute a government 
or a state. D. Alan Heslop, Political System, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA (Mar. 17, 
2017), https://www.britannica.com/topic/political-system. It is part of the broader 
social system. Id. The term is used interchangeably in this Article with government or 
the state.  
5.  There is no suggestion that African leaders have always used the state to 
legitimately pursue development, for they do not always do so. Instead, as Professor 
Claude Ake most presciently pointed out many years ago, time and again, these 
leaders have (ab)used the state for purposes that have little to do with development. 
See CLAUDE AKE, DEMOCRACY AND DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA (1996). According to 
Ake, the trouble with economic development in Africa “is not so much that 
development has failed as that it was never really on the agenda in the first place.” Id. 
at 1. To be sure, African leaders were not the only rulers who used the state 
illegitimately for purposes other than development. Instead, the colonial authorities 
before them did the same. See, e.g., Matthew Craven, Between Law and History: The 
Berlin Conference of 1884-1885 and the Logic of Free Trade, 3 LONDON REV. INT’L 
L. 31-59 (Mar. 10, 2015), http://lril.oxfordjournals.org/content/3/1/31.full. One 
infamous moment was the Berlin Conference of 1885 designed for factors other than 
to benefit Africans (except arguably for the abolition of the slave trade). Id. The main 
purpose was to consolidate pacification to minimize friction among European 
authorities in their scramble for colonies in the continent. See, e.g., id; MURIEL E. 
CHAMBERLAIN, THE SCRAMBLE FOR AFRICA (Pearson Education Ltd., 3d ed. 2010); 
STIG FÖRSTER ET AL., BISMARK, EUROPE, AND AFRICA: THE BERLIN AFRICA 
CONFERENCE 1884-1885 AND THE ONSET OF PARTITION (1989). 
6.   Artificial boundaries refers to borders determined arbitrarily on maps by 
European capitals with no regard for geography (factors such as rivers, mountains, 
and related natural landmarks) and ethnic composition of the areas whose borders 
were designed. See Stelios Michalopoulos & Elias Papaioannou, The Long-Run 
Effects of the Scramble for Africa (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper 
No. 17620-11, 2011), http://www.nber.org/papers/w17620.  
7.  Landlocked states are countries which lack direct coastal access to the sea. 
These are: Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Central African Republic, Chad, 
Ethiopia, Lesotho, Malawi, Mali, Niger, Rwanda, Swaziland, Uganda, Zambia, and 
Zimbabwe. Matt Rosenberg, How Many African Countries Are Landlocked? And Why 
Does It Matter, ABOUT EDUCATION (Apr. 09, 2017), 
http://geography.about.com/od/economic-geography/fl/How-Many-African-
Countries-Are-Landlocked.htm. See also PAUL COLLIER, THE BOTTOM BILLION: 
WHY THE POOREST COUNTRIES ARE FAILING AND WHAT CAN BE DONE ABOUT IT 51–
63 (2007). A country’s level of access to water can have an enormous impact on its 
economy in many ways, three of which are most notable. These three negative impacts 
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economies in the continent are too small and fragmented to achieve 
economies of scale independently.8 Accordingly, in the years 
immediately following independence, there was much debate regarding 
appropriate political structures in the context of the capacity of these 
marginal states to economically develop.9 Regional economic 
integration schemes evolved in various parts of the continent in 
response to this concern.10 The proliferation coincided with the birth of 
                                                          
are less access to trade (it is cheaper to transport goods over water than over land), 
high transit costs, and increased dependence on “transit” neighbors (i.e. states with 
access to the sea or coast). Rosenberg, supra. The fifteen landlocked states do not 
include partially-landlocked states like Gambia, under scrutiny in this paper.  
8. See Paul Collier & Tony Venables, Trade and Economic Performance: Does 
Africa’s Fragmentation Matter? Paper Presented at the Annual Bank Conference on 
Development Economics, Cape Town, S. Afr. (June 9-11, 2008), 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTABCDESOUAFR2008/Resources/TonyVena
bles.pdf.  
9.  See BASIL DAVIDSON, MODERN AFRICA: A SOCIAL AND POLITICAL HISTORY 
218–45 (3d ed. 1994) (portraying “questions about development” among various 
“progress and failure” emanating from new governments). In retrospect, given the 
urgent need for development, it was a debate tinged with much irony. For example, 
Tanzanian leader, Julius Nyerere, advised that Africans “must run” while the rest of 
the world walks if the region stood any chance of bridging the gap in development 
between it and the rest of the world. See generally WILLIAM EDGETT SMITH, WE MUST 
RUN WHILE THEY WALK: A PORTRAIT OF AFRICA’S JULIUS NYERERE (1971).  
10. See Trudi Hartzenberg, Regional Integration in Africa (World Trade 
Organization, Staff Working Paper ERSD-2011-14, 2011) (stating, inter alia, that 
“African governments have concluded a very large number of regional integration 
arrangements, several of which have significant membership overlap”); Tesfaye 
Dinka & Walter Kennes, Africa’s Regional Integration Arrangements: History and 
Challenges, Discussion Paper No. 74, EUROPEAN CENTER FOR DEV. POLICY 
MANAGEMENT (Sept. 2007), http://ecdpm.org/publications/africas-regional-
integration-arrangements-history-challenges/; Olufemi A. Babarinde, Regionalism 
and African Foreign Policies, AFRICAN FOREIGN POLICIES 215–48 (Stephen Wright, 
ed., 1999) (surveying the impacts of regional integration on African foreign policies). 
See also Caroline Ko, Regional Integration is a Must for Africa, WORLD ECON. 
FORUM (May 10, 2013), https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2013/05/regional-
integration-is-a-must-for-africa/. These economic communities include: East African 
Community (EAC), originally formed in 1967, collapsed in 1977, and revived in 2000 
(in fact the history of the organization dates back to 1917, as indicated in infra note 
25); the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), formed in 1975; 
the Southern African Development Community (SADC), formed in 1980 originally 
as South African Development Coordinating Conference (SADCC); the Economic 
Community of Central African States (ECCAS), founded in 1983; the 
Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), founded in 1986; the Arab 
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the U.N. Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) in 1958, soon after 
Ghana’s independence in 1957.11 The ECA is charged with the mission 
of promoting economic and social development in Africa, fostering 
intra-regional economic integration, and galvanizing cooperation for 
Africa’s development.12 
Then came the “lost decade of the 1980s” when Africa fell behind 
the rest of the world in many areas of general living standards, including 
access to education and healthcare.13 In actuality, this period spanned 
close to one generation from 1970 to 1995. During that lost decade, 
                                                          
Maghreb Union (UMA), founded in 1989; the Community of Sahel-Saharan States 
(CEN-SAD), founded in 1993; and, the Common Market for Eastern and Southern 
Africa (COMESA), formed in 1994. For detailed information on these communities, 
see PHILIP C. AKA, HUMAN RIGHTS IN NIGERIA’S EXTERNAL RELATIONS: BUILDING 
THE RECORD OF A MORAL SUPERPOWER 227–43 (2017). Gambia and Senegal, the two 
countries here under examination, are founding members of ECOWAS, the key 
economic community in West Africa. Id. at 229 (Table 10.1); see also Economic 
Community of West African States, INT’L DEMOCRACY WATCH, 
http://www.internationaldemocracywatch.org/ index.php/economic-community-of-
west-african-states-.  
11. See KWAME AKONOR, AFRICAN ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS 11 (2009).  
12. Overview, United Nations Economic Commission for Africa, 
http://www.uneca.org/pages/overview (last visited Apr. 12, 2017). To realize these 
goals, the ECA conducts various activities, including collecting data on African 
development and providing advisory services in key thematic fields, among them 
macro-economic policy, regional integration and trade, and governance. Id.  
13. See John Darnton, “Lost Decade” Drains Africa’s Vitality, NY TIMES (June 
19, 1994), http://www.nytimes.com/1994/06/19/world/lost-decade-drains-africa-s-
vitality.html?pagewanted=all. It was an era marked by structural adjustment programs 
(and resultant belt-tightening programs with negative consequences for healthcare, 
education and other social programs) on many African economies, imposed in return 
for loans by international monetary institutions, specifically the International 
Monetary Fund, and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 
more famously known as the World Bank. See, e.g., Fraser Logan, Did Structural 
Adjustment Programs Assist African Development?, E-INT’L RELATIONS STUDENTS 
(Jan. 13, 2015), http://www.e-ir.info/2015/01/13/did-structural-adjustment-
programmes-assist-african-development/; Franz Heidhues & Gideon Obare, Lessons 
from Structural Adjustment Programs and Their Effects in Africa, in 1 Q. J. INT’L 
AGRIC. 55–64 (2011), http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/bitstream/155490/2/4 
Heidhues.pdf. See also H. W. Singer, The 1980s: A Lost Decade—Development in 
Reverse?, in GROWTH AND EXTERNAL DEBT MANAGEMENT 46–56 (H. W. Singer & 
Soumitra Sharma, eds., 1989); A THOUSAND FLOWERS: SOCIAL STRUGGLES AGAINST 
STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT IN AFRICAN UNIVERSITIES (Silvia Federici et al., eds., 
2000).  
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alternately referred to in this Article as “locust years,” real per capita 
income nearly doubled in all world regions, except for Black Africa, 
which instead declined.14 In the period since the lost decade, the 
political-structure debate turned into a debate regarding whether there 
was any chance left in the capacity of African states to engender 
development.15  
The discourse chimed with the important works of Professors 
Robert H. Jackson and Carl G. Rosberg on the non-institutionalized 
nature of leadership in Africa as well as the lack of legitimacy of 
African states. Regarding the first, Jackson and Rosberg argued that 
rather than institutions, such as political parties, government in Africa 
is often governed by personal rule.16 For Professors Jackson and 
                                                          
14. See, e.g., UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON TRADE & DEVELOPMENT, 
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA: PERFORMANCE, PROSPECTS AND POLICY 
ISSUES, passim (2001), http://unctad.org/en/Docs/pogdsafricad1.en.pdf. “Locust 
years” or “years of locust” is a Biblical expression that denotes period of economic 
hardship. RANDOM HOUSE UNABRIDGED DICT. (1997), 
https://www.infoplease.com/dictionary/locust-years. Two germane sections in the 
Bible are: Joel 2:25 which reads, “I will restore to you the years the swarming locust 
has eaten”; and Genesis 41: 1–37 where Joseph interpreted for the Pharaoh of Egypt 
two interlinked dreams, one involving seven years of bountiful harvests followed by 
seven years of severe famine, which he wisely solved with advice for the Pharaoh to 
store grain during the bountiful years in preparation for the lean years. Unlike ancient 
Egypt, Africa endured economic famine unpreceded by any bountiful harvests, and 
there was no perceivable restoration of any years that the proverbial swarming locust 
devoured. Part III.B, infra, lays out the context for this famine within the meaning of 
this Article.  
15. See AKE, supra note 5, passim.  
16. See generally ROBERT H. JACKSON & CARL G. ROSBERG, PERSONAL RULE 
IN BLACK AFRICA: PRINCE, AUTOCRAT, PROPHET, TYRANT (1982). The categories of 
autocrat and tyrants should be obvious, leaving princes and prophets as the only two 
categories needing elaboration. Prince is a nomenclature Professors Jackson and 
Rosberg set aside for nondemocratic leaders, such as Jomo Kenyatta of Kenya; Haile 
Selassie of Ethiopia; two rulers of Liberia, William Tubman and William Tolbert; 
and, for our purpose here, Leopold Senghor of Senegal. While there are important 
variations among them, what these leaders had in common was their ability to amass 
state power during their period in office to the diminishment of the constitutional order 
that they inherited when they came into office. Prophet whose list is thin in Africa 
included, most notably, Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana, and Julius Nyerere of Tanzania. 
While again, there are variations among them, political prophets are visionaries who 
worked to reshape their societies. One of the weaknesses of the Jackson-Rosberg 
theory is that none of the categories fits an African leader like Dawda Jawara who, 
7
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Rosberg, lack of domestic legitimacy refers to the reality that many 
weak states in Africa persist out of juridical factors embedded in 
international law rather than out of a capacity to perform the domestic 
empirical functions of a state, met when a national government (the 
entity in international law which represents the state) exercises effective 
“control over the people, organizations, and activities within [its] 
territorial jurisdiction . . . .”17  
Notable improvements came after the lost decade of the 1980s. For 
example, in 2011, the Economist branded Africa a “hopeful 
continent,”18 after declaring the region “hopeless” little over one decade 
before.19 However, progress remains uneven and non-robust.20 Several 
narratives reflect this assessment. Some analysts advocate “grassroots 
development efforts that build on domestic cultural institutions” as the 
                                                          
although he remained in office for nearly three decades, did not wield power as a “big 
man” to the detriment of the evolution of institutions and the rule of law.  
17. Robert H. Jackson & Carl G. Rosberg, Why Africa’s Weak States Persist: 
The Empirical and the Juridical in Statehood, 35 WORLD POLITICS 1 (1982). Jackson 
and Rosberg observed that “[i]f the persistence of a state were primarily the result of 
empirical statehood,” several “African countries would clearly not qualify as states 
some of the time.” Id. at 3. For them the independence of these states “reveals the 
assumption of the contemporary international community that even countries of very 
questionable viability and capacities can be preserved by a benevolent international 
society.” Id. at 16.  
18. The Hopeful Continent: Africa Rising, ECONOMIST (Dec. 3, 2011), 
http://www.economist.com/node/21541015 (stating that after “decades of slow 
growth, Africa has a real chance to follow the footsteps of” strong economies in Asia, 
such as those of China and India). The magazine observed that six of the world’s ten 
fastest-growing countries were in Africa. Id.  
19. Hopeless Africa, ECONOMIST (May 13, 2000), 
http://www.economist.com/node/333429. Unending wars and natural disasters 
factored heavily in the magazine’s assessment of the African condition as hopeless. 
Id. Since 1980, about 30 wars have been fought in Africa, resulting in millions of 
deaths and millions more displaced. See generally WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, 
WORLD REPORT ON VIOLENCE AND HEALTH (Etienne G. Krug et al., eds., 2002). 
20. See, e.g., Susan Lund & Arend van Wamelen, Lions on the Move: 10 Things 
You Don’t Know about Africa’s Booming Economy, FOREIGN POLICY (Sept. 1, 2012), 
http://foreignpolicy.com/2012/09/01/lions-on-the-move/ (concluding that Africa’s 
future looks bright, but that the continent has ways to go to achieve sustainable 
progress).  
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way forward for African states,21 while others contend that it is about 
time African states govern themselves using indigenous political 
structures and ideologies that are adapted to modern times.22 Yet others 
have analyzed the role of deeply-rooted pre-colonial ethnic institutions 
in shaping comparative regional development within African 
countries.23 Most recently, former U.S. President, Barack Obama, 
advised that Africa “needs strong institutions,” not strongmen.24 
Topping it all, some East African leaders have proposed an economic 
union, the East African Community (EAC), made up of Burundi, 
Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania, Uganda, and possibly the newly-
independent South Sudan; collectively, these states are projected to 
create an integrated market of about 120 million people.25 This would 
create, in market size, the second-largest state, after Nigeria, fourth-
largest in Africa, and seventeenth-largest in the world.26  
                                                          
21. Geoffrey E. Schneider, Comparative Institutional Advantage and the 
Appropriate Development Model for Sub-Saharan Africa, 37 FORUM FOR SOCIAL 
ECONS. 115–24 (2008).  
22. DANIEL T. OSABU-KLE, COMPATIBLE CULTURAL DEMOCRACY: THE KEY TO 
DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA 25 (2000).   
23. Stelios Michalopoulos & Elias Papaioannou, Pre-Colonial Ethnic 
Institutions and Contemporary African Development, 81 ECONOMETRICA 113–52 
(2013) (analyzing the role of deeply-rooted pre-colonial ethnic institutions in shaping 
comparative regional development within African countries).  
24. Obama, supra note 1.  
25. East African Community (EAC), AFRICAN UNION, 
http://www.au.int/en/recs/eac (last visited Apr. 12, 2017); Conor Gaffey, Uganda’s 
Museveni Wants to Create an East African Superstate, NEWSWEEK (Feb. 10, 2016), 
http://www.newsweek.com/ugandas-museveni-wants-create-east-african-superstate-
424975. The treaty establishing the EAC was signed in 1999. But the history of the 
organization goes back to 1917 when Kenya and Uganda, still dependent countries, 
formed a Customs Union that Tanganyika (later on Tanzania) joined in 1927. History 
of the EAC, EAST AFRICAN COMMUNITY, http://www.eac.int/about/EAC-history (last 
visited Apr. 12, 2017).  
26. See Gaffey, supra note 25. The context for Yoweri Museveni’s views was a 
news conference ahead of presidential elections in Uganda on Feb. 18, 2016, which 
Museveni, Uganda’s leader since 1986, won, extending his 30-year rule. But this is a 
consistent theme for Museveni who indicated, circa 2011, while commenting on the 
importance of economic integration in East Africa, that “East Africa would ensure the 
future of black people more than just Uganda. Uganda is going to develop, Uganda is 
going to become a modern country—but a small one.” Uganda’s Yoweri Museveni in 
Profile, BBC NEWS AFRICA (May 12, 2011), www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-
12421747. 
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This Article joins the list of studies on the debate regarding 
appropriate governance structure for development in Africa in the 21st 
century, using the Senegambia Confederation (1982-1989) as a case 
study. Its argument is as follows: Redrawing Africa’s artificial borders 
is necessary to achieve development in the continent in this century; 
however, that option is a grand strategy that is far-fetched even as the 
need for development within the region remains as dire as ever. For the 
time being, while still keeping that ultimate option in mind, more 
midrange measures are worth trying. Within the context of these 
midrange measures, a proper formula for governance and development 
in Africa, in this Article conveniently equated with political 
engineering, must go hand in hand with attitudinal changes (cultural 
engineering), plus political (or governmental) performance. Each of 
these key terms is elaborated later below.  
Senegal and Gambia are among the small number of politically 
stable countries in Africa; Senegal is one of the few countries in Africa 
that has never experienced a military takeover of power.27 Gambia was 
not so lucky. There, the military, “the internal opponent most feared by 
African rulers,”28 seized power in 1994, after a failed attempt in 1981.29 
However, the relative stability of the two states obscures issues, 
including deficiencies in political engineering, cultural engineering, 
and governmental performance, which the failure of the Senegambia 
Confederation importantly brings to the fore.  
The ensuing conversation falls into three main sections. The first is 
a historical background account necessary to properly understand the 
politics of Senegambia, including past events that ineluctably shaped 
those politics.30 The second is a description of the Senegambia 
confederation that ties the political experiment to the economic 
difficulties in Africa during the 1980s. The third is a delineation of 
several lessons to be drawn from the failure of the political experiment 
regarding appropriate structures for economic development and 
prospects for the future. 
                                                          
27. Danielle Resnick, Lessons from Africa’s Democratic Upheavals, UNITED 
NATIONS UNIVERSITY (Apr. 26, 2012), http://unu.edu/publications/articles/lessons-
from-africa-s-democratic-upheavals.html.   
28. Jackson & Rosberg, supra note 17, at 8.  
29. See infra notes 136, 170, and 190.  
30. See FRANK L. WILSON, CONCEPTS AND ISSUES IN COMPARATIVE POLITICS: 
AN INTRODUCTION TO COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 17 (1996).  
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II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
Background histories are important because every story has a 
starting point, and past events have a tendency to shape contemporary 
politics.31 A conceivable way to approach the conversation, which this 
section adopts, is to survey colonial attitudes toward development in 
Senegambia, including efforts made, or lack thereof, to integrate 
Senegal and Gambia before their respective independences in the 
1960s. But first, a statement on basic data regarding the two countries. 
A.  Basic Data Relating to Senegal and Gambia 
Senegal is a state which surrounds Gambia on three sides. Senegal 
is bordered on the north by Mauritania, on the south by Guinea and 
Guinea-Bissau, on the east by Mali, and on the west by the Atlantic 
Ocean.32 Like its neighbor Gambia, Senegal is named after River 
Senegal, which courses through the country.33 Similarly, the 
Casamance region within Senegal is named after the River Casamance, 
south of the Gambian River.34 The Casamance region campaigned for 
a separate state predating the independence of Senegal.35 Senegal is a 
land of 79,951 square miles, slightly smaller in land area than South 
Dakota in the United States,36 with a population of nearly 16 million 
                                                          
31. Id.  
32. Senegal, INFOPLEASE, http://www.infoplease.com/country/senegal.html 
(last visited May 01, 2017) [hereinafter Senegal, INFOPLEASE].  
33. Senegal, COUNTRIES AND THEIR CULTURES, 
http://www.everyculture.com/Sa-Th/Senegal.html (last visited Apr. 21, 2017) (As the 
story goes, the country takes its name from River Senegal, in turn, an adaptation of 
the Wolof term Sunugal, meaning “our dugout canoe,” colloquially “we are all in the 
same boat.”).  
34. Casamance Region, Senegal, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA (Sept. 28, 2006), 
https://www.britannica.com/place/Casamance. 
35. See, e.g., Toma Serna, Casamance: Neither War nor Peace, INSIGHT ON 
CONFLICT (Dec. 9, 2015), https://www.insightonconflict.org/blog/2015/12/ 
casamance-neither-war-nor-peace/; AÏSSATOU FALL, UNDERSTANDING THE 
CASAMANCE CONFLICT: A BACKGROUND MONOGRAPH NO. 7 (Kofi Annan Int’l 
Peacekeeping Training Ctr ed., 2011).  
36. Senegal, INFOPLEASE supra note 32.  
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residents.37 It is a predominantly rural country of limited natural 
resources whose main sources of foreign exchange are agriculture (fish, 
peanuts, and cotton), phosphate, and increasingly, tourism.38 In 2015, 
the country’s gross domestic product (GDP) was nearly $14 billion 
USD, accounting for 0.02 percent of the world economy.39 
Senegal gained independence from France in June of 1960 as part 
of the Mali Federation (joining Senegal and then French Soudan) and 
in its own right as a separate entity in August of the same year, 
following its withdrawal from the federation.40 However, the date 
Senegalese citizens observe as their “national” day is April 4, 1960, the 
date France signed the transfer of power instrument of the Mali 
Federation.41 French presence in Senegal dates back to the seventeenth 
century and includes milestones dates such as 1638 when the French 
built their first trading station at the mouth of the Senegal River; 1659 
when they founded Saint Louis (soon to become a key slave trading 
port) at the mouth of the same river; 1677 when they took over the 
island of Goree, takeoff points for slaves shipped into the New World 
during the Middle Passage; 1895 when Senegal became part of French 
West Africa;42 and 1946 when, together with other French colonies in 
West Africa, Senegal became an overseas territory of France.43   
                                                          
37. Senegal Population (Live), WORLDOMETERS, 
http://www.worldometers.info/world-population/senegal-population/ (last visited 
Apr. 12, 2017); Senegal, THE WORLD FACTBOOK, 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/sg.html (last 
visited May 01, 2017).  
38. Senegal, WORLDMARK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF NATIONS (2007), 
http://www.encyclopedia.com/places/africa/senegal-political-geography/senegal.  
39. Senegal GDP, TRADING ECONOMICS, www.tradingeconomics.com/ 
senegal/gdp (last visited May 01, 2017).  
40. See Senegal: History, INFOPLEASE, http://www.infoplease.com/ 
encyclopedia/world/senegal-country-africa-history.html (last visited Apr. 27, 2017).  
41. See Senegal, THE WORLD FACTBOOK, supra note 37.  
42. Senegal: History, supra note 40; History of Senegal, HISTORY WORLD, 
http://www.historyworld.net/wrldhis/plaintexthistories.asp?historyid=ac64 (last 
visited Apr. 27, 2017).  
43. See ROBERT ALDRICH, GREATER FRANCE: A HISTORY OF FRENCH 
OVERSEAS EXPANSION (1996). 
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Since its independence, Senegal has operated a mixed presidential-
parliamentary system of government44 bequeathed to it by France. It is 
a dual-executive arrangement featuring a president and a prime 
minister, each vested with significant decision making powers where, 
in some cases, as Senegal arguably exemplifies, “the president has even 
greater constitutional powers than the president of the United States, 
while the legislature has fewer powers than the U.S. Congress.”45 For 
much of its history after independence, Senegal operated a one-party 
system dominated by the Parti Socialiste du Sénégal (Socialist Party of 
Senegal).46 The situation changed in 1976 when the government 
allowed other political parties to compete for power, although a true 
multiparty system evolved only beginning in April of 1981 when 
lingering restrictions on multiparty competition were lifted.47  
Senegal is a unitary state of one central government and fourteen 
regions, plus numerous local governments.48 The fourteen regions are: 
Dakar, Diourbel, Fatick, Kaffrine, Kaolack, Kédougou, Kolda, Louga, 
Matam, Saint-Louis, Sédhiou, Tambacounda, Thiès, and Ziguinchor.49 
Kolda and Ziguinchor are located in the Casamance province,50 site of 
the conflict that forms a flashpoint in Senegalese politics,51 and to 
which we return shortly. Senegal is made up of about seventeen ethnic 
groups,52 among them, in order of numerical strength: the Wolof, 
                                                          
44. On this system of government, see MICHAEL J. SODARO, COMPARATIVE 
POLITICS: A GLOBAL INTRODUCTION 203–05 (3d ed. 2008).  
45. Id. at 203. 
46. See Marilyn Schoenle, Senegalese Politics and the Socialist Party, PREZI 
(Dec. 3, 2014), https://prezi.com/agcm8eeyhgjm/senegalese-politics-and-the-
socialist-party/; John Farmer, Democratic Party Assumes Office as President of 
Senegal, WORLD SOCIALIST WEB SITE (Apr. 5, 2000), 
https://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2000/04/sene-a05.html.  
47. See Christof Hartmann, Senegal’s Party System: The Limits of Formal 
Regulation, 17 DEMOCRATIZATION 769–86 (2010).  
48. Senegal: Government and Society, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, 
https://www.britannica.com/place/Senegal/Government-and-society (last visited Apr. 
12, 2017). 
49. Regions of Senegal, STATOIDS (June 30, 2015), 
http://www.statoids.com/usn.html. 
50. See FALL, supra note 35, at 8 (map).  
51. See FALL, supra note 35. 
52. An ethnic group is “a named social category of people based on subjective 
perceptions of shared attributes, such as common ancestry or heritage, history, 
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making up over 43 percent of the population; the Pular, accounting for 
nearly 24 percent; the Serer (closely related to the Wolof), nearly 15 
percent; the Diola, nearly 4 percent (but forming about 60 percent of 
the Casamance); and the Mandinka or Malinké (some of whom are 
found in the Casamance), approximately 3 percent.53  
Regarding the Casamance conflict, the dispute pits the Diola 
people, the dominant ethnic group in Casamance, agitating for separate 
statehood from Senegal against the Senegalese government which is 
determined to keep the state unified.54 On the Casamance side, the face 
of the campaign for independence is the Movement des Forces 
Democratiques de la Casamance (MFDC), whose agitation for regional 
autonomy, dating back to 1947, was initially peaceful but turned violent 
in 1982.55 The Diolas, the moving force behind the agitation, base their 
struggle on factors that include the “historical autonomy of the 
Casamance province.”56 Casamance had a strategic value for European 
colonialists as a “trading point for slaves, wax, ivory, and rice.”57 
Topographically, the region differs in important respects from the rest 
of Senegal: “it gets more rain,” while its landscapes, including areas of 
rain forest, and beaches “are a major tourist attraction.”58 Moreover, 
Casamance culture “leans more towards the south and Guinea, rather 
than the north of Senegal itself.”59 The French secured the territory from 
the Portuguese in exchange for another territory.60  
                                                          
homeland, and language that set its people apart from other groups.” JAMES PEOPLE 
& GARRICK BAILEY, HUMANITY: AN INTRODUCTION TO CULTURAL ANTHROPOLOGY 
389 (9th ed. 2012). Unlike other cleavages, such as religion, ethnicity “cut[s] across 
socioeconomic class differences, drawing members from all strata of the population.” 
Id.   
53. Senegal, WORLDMARK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF NATIONS, supra note 38; FALL, 
supra note 35, at 8.  
54. See FALL, supra note 35, passim.  
55. Id. at 4. The MFDC was founded in Mar. 1947 by Emile Badiane, a 
politician and Casamance native. It evolved as a political party that worked for “more 
recognition, development and inclusion of the Casamance” people in post-colonial 
Senegal. Id. at 17 n.43.  
56. Id. at. 4.  
57. Id. at 6.  
58. Id.  
59. Id. at 8.  
60. Id. at 5.  
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Casamance had an experience of colonialism different from the rest 
of Senegal. Because of violent resistance against French rule by the 
Diolas, the region was managed as a colony on its own, separate from 
the rest of Senegal from 1854 to 1939 and was not integrated with the 
rest of the state until the end of the colonial period.61 Their decentralized 
and egalitarian character, vis-à-vis the centralized hierarchical structure 
of the rest of Senegal to the North, together with their history of 
resistance to foreign rule, makes the Diolas non-amenable to easy 
governance.62  
Lastly, despite its ethnic diversity, Senegalese society “exhibits a 
generally high degree of cultural homogeneity to which the Casamance 
[region] seems to be an exception.”63 And, although part of a heavily 
Muslim state, the region is minimally Islamized with a substantial 
number of Christians and/or adherents of traditional religions.64 
Gambia is surrounded by Senegal in all geographic corners, except 
for the respite of an outlet to the Atlantic Ocean on the West65 that 
blocks complete encirclement—a feature on the map that gives the 
country the look of “a banana in the teeth of Senegal.”66 It is named 
                                                          
61. Id. at 6.  
62. Id. at 5, n.7, 6, and 15. 
63. Id. at 8.  
64. Id. at 8–9.  
65. See West Africa Map, MAPS OF THE WORLD, 
http://www.mapsofworld.com/africa/regions/western-africa-map.html (last visited 
Mar. 11, 2017).  
66. Christopher W. Nordlinger, Africa’s Senegambia: A Confederation More of 
Form than Substance, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (Jan. 6, 1983), 
http://www.csmonitor.com/1983/0106/010652.html. Given the landlocked character 
of many countries in Africa, referred to in the introduction of this Article, 
encirclement inside the borders of another country is a geopolitical feature not unique 
to Gambia. Instead, more or less similarly-situated countries in Africa include 
Lesotho, and Swaziland, both of which are enclaves within South Africa; Malawi, 
surrounded by Mozambique, Tanzania, and Zambia; and Cabinda, an Angolan 
territory sandwiched in between the Republic of Congo, and the Democratic Republic 
of the Congo, formerly Zaïre. See Southern Africa Region Map, MAPS OF WORLD, 
http://www.mapsofworld.com/africa/regions/southern-africa-map.html (last visited 
Mar. 11, 2017) (Lesotho and Swaziland); Malawi, WORLD ATLAS, 
http://www.worldatlas.com/webimage/countrys/africa/mw.htm (last visited Mar. 11, 
2017); Ken Jennings, Cabinda: The Tiny Oil-Rich Corner of Africa Everyone’s 
Fighting For, CONDE NAST TRAVELER (June 1, 2016), 
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after River Gambia, which courses through the state for 200 miles and 
connects to the Atlantic Ocean.67 Gambia is 4,363 square miles, about 
twice the land area of Delaware State in the United States,68 with a 
population in 2016 of almost 2.1 million people.69  
Like Senegal, Gambia is a state of limited natural resources whose 
main sources of foreign exchange are agriculture (including livestock), 
tourism, informal trade around its borders involving re-exports of 
products (that its neighbors regard as smuggling), remittances from 
Gambians abroad, and foreign assistance.70 In 2014, the year for which 
information is available, Gambia had a GDP of approximately $85 
million USD, accounting for less than 0.01 percent of the world 
economy.71  
Gambia gained independence from the United Kingdom on 
February 18, 1965, after 72 years of British colonial control, counting 
from 1893 when Britain imposed indirect rule on the territory.72 It 
became a republic in 1970 in a move to eliminate or minimize lingering 
vestiges of its British colonial past, most notably retention of the Queen 
                                                          
http://www.cntraveler.com/stories/2016-06-01/cabinda-the-tiny-oil-rich-corner-of-
africa. 
67. See generally Gambia, INFOPLEASE.COM, http://www.infoplease.com/ 
country/gambia.html (last visited Mar. 12, 2017). There was something about colonial 
authorities and rivers. Although some overlap occurred in their spheres of influence, 
French trade centered around key landmarks that include the Senegal River, while 
English trade centered on the Gambian River. Edmun B. Richmond, Senegambia and 
the Confederation: History, Expectations, and Disillusions, 10 J. THIRD WORLD 
STUD. 172, 176 (1993).  
68. Gambia, supra note 67.  
69. Gambia Population (Live), WORLDOMETERS, 
http://www.worldometers.info/world-population/gambiapopulation/ (last visited 
Mar. 12, 2017); The Gambia, THE WORLD FACTBOOK (Jan. 12, 2017), 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/resources/the-world-factbook/geos/ga.html. 
70. See Gambian GDP Annual Growth Rate, TRADING ECONOMICS, 
www.tradingeconomics.com/gambia/gap-growth-annual (last visited Mar. 12, 2017); 
Senegal GDP Annual Growth Rate, TRADING ECONOMICS, 
http://www.tradingeconomics.com/senegal/gdp-growth-annual (last visited Mar. 12, 
2017).  
71. Gambia GDP 1966-2016, TRADING ECONOMICS, 
www.tradingeconomics.com/gambia/gdp (last visited Mar. 12, 2017).  
72. Colonial System of Administration in Gambia, Indirect Rule in the Gambia 
Protectorate, ACCESS GAMBIA, http://www.accessgambia.com/information/colonial-
government.html (last visited May 3, 2017). 
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of England as governor-general of the state.73 British presence in the 
land dates back to 1587 when British traders visited the area,74 and 
subsequently established the colony of Gambia in 1816.75 Highlights of 
British presence include a conference in Paris in 1889 where France 
ceded control of the Gambia River to the U.K.,76 and declaration of the 
colony as a protectorate in 1900.77   
Following independence, Gambia operated a parliamentary system 
of government for several years before changing into a modified 
presidential system in the aftermath of its achievement of republican 
status in 1970.78 For the first thirty years after independence, Gambia 
was a multiparty state where the ruling party held sway,79 but only 
nominally multiparty since the democratic experiment that has followed 
the successful military coup in 1994. That era came to a close on 
January 19, 2017, with the inauguration of Adama Barrow as Gambia’s 
third president.80 Gambia is home to multiple ethnic groups, including 
                                                          
73. Gambia, The History, COMMONWEALTH, thecommonwealth.org/our-
member-countries/gambia/history (last visited Mar. 12, 2017). 
74. Colonial History, GAMBIA.COM, http://www.ttag.gm/colonial-history.php 
(last visited Mar. 12, 2017).  
75. GODFREY MWAKIKAGILE, ETHNIC DIVERSITY AND INTEGRATION IN THE 
GAMBIA: THE LAND, THE PEOPLE, AND THE CULTURE 14 (2010).  
76. History: Precolonial History, British Protectorate, ENCYCLOPEDIA 
BRITANNICA, https://www.britannica.com/place/The-Gambia/History (last visited 
Mar. 3, 2017). 
77. MWAKIKAGILE, supra note 75, at 15.  
78. OUSMAN A.S. JAMMEH, THE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF THE GAMBIA: 1965-
2010, 5 (2011) (observing that although it contains features of a conventional 
presidential system, Gambia’s constitutional order and electoral system lack the full 
measure of separation of powers found in the classic presidential system). For features 
distinguishing the parliamentary and presidential electoral systems, see SODARO, 
supra note 44, at 194–203. One key anchor of that distinction is that in the 
parliamentary system, executive power is divided between a president who holds 
ceremonial powers as head of state and a prime minister vested with real powers as 
head of government, whereas in a presidential system, the president is both head of 
state and head of government. See id. at 194, 196.  
79. MWAKIKAGILE, supra note 75, at 21.  
80. See Tim Cocks, Gambia’s New President Adama Barrow Inaugurated after 
Being Forced into Exile by Yahya Jammeh, INDEPENDENT (Feb. 18, 2017, 23:50 
GMT), http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/africa/gambia-president-adama-
barrow-returns-from-exile-senegal-yahya-jammeh-a7587966.html; Gambia’s Yahya 
Jammeh Loses Election to Adama Barrow, AL JAZEERA (Dec. 2, 2016), 
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in order of numerousness: the Mandinka or Malinké, forming 42 
percent of the population; the Fula, 18 percent; the Wolof, 16 percent; 
the Jola, 10 percent; the Seraluleh, 7 percent; and the Serer, little over 
3 percent.81 Gambia is a unitary state made up of one central 
government, five regions, two municipalities,82 and numerous local 
governments. The regions are West Coast River, Lower River, North 
River, Central River, and Upper River.83 The two municipalities are 
Banjul and Kanifing.84   
Africa is a region with an immense ethnic consciousness, indicated 
most notably by being inhabited by about 2,000 ethnic groups.85 
Gambia and Senegal have multiple ethnic nationalities in common, 
including the Wolof, the Serer, and the Malinké, among others.86 The 
breakdown of Senegal’s four leaders since the state’s independence, 
including the ethnic identity of each leader, is as follows: Léopold S. 
Senghor, Serer; Abdou Diouf, Wolof; Abdoulaye Wade, Wolof; and 
Macky Sall, Pular.87 Gambia has had three leaders since its 
                                                          
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/12/gambia-yahya-jammeh-loses-election-
adama-barrow-161202130519550.html. Barrow is Gambia’s third president since 
independence after Dawda K. Jawara (1970-94, but before then from 1965 until 1970 
as prime minister), and Yahya Jammeh (1996-2017, with the first two years before 
1996 as military dictator). See Gambia, The, RULERS, 
http://www.rulers.org/rulg1.html#gambia (last visited May 3, 2017). 
81. The Gambia, WORLDMARK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF NATIONS (2007), 
http://www.encyclopedia.com/places/africa/gambian-political-geography/gambia; 
The Gambia, THE WORLD FACTBOOK, supra note 69.  
82. Overview: UNICEF in the Gambia, UNICEF, 
http://www.unicef.org/gambia/overview.html (last visited Mar. 12, 2017).  
83. Id.  
84. Id. 
85. Christine Mungai, Africa’s Borders Split Over 177 Ethnic Groups and Their 
‘Real’ Lines Aren’t Where You Think, MAIL & GUARDIAN AFR. (Jan. 13, 2015), 
http://mgafrica.com/article/2015-01-09-africas-real-borders-are-not-where-you-
think.  
86. See, e.g., Ebou Momar Taal, Senegambian Ethnic Groups: Common Origins 
and Cultural Affinities Factors and Forces of National Unity, Peace and Stability, 
POINT (Apr. 22, 2010), http://thepoint.gm/africa/gambia/article/senegambian-ethnic-
groups-common-origins-and-cultural-affinities-factors-and-forces-of-national-unit.  
87. See STEPHEN SNOOK ET AL., DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND 
GOVERNANCE OF ASSESSMENT OF SENEGAL: FINAL REPORT 4–5 (USAID, 2013), 
http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/pnaec828.pdf (commenting on “ethnicity and ethnic 
relations in Senegal”). The takeaway from the discussion is that, for the most part, 
18
California Western International Law Journal, Vol. 47, No. 2 [2017], Art. 6
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwilj/vol47/iss2/6
AkaCameraReady final (Do Not Delete) 7/5/2017  10:05 AM 
2017] THE SENEGAMBIA CONFEDERATION 127 
independence: Dawda K. Jawara, who is Wolof;88 Yahya Jammeh, who 
is Jola;89 and Barrow, who is Fula.90 In Africa, a leader’s ethnic identity 
is important because of the tendency of other groups to accuse the 
ethnic group whose member is at the helm of “ethnic domination,” 
especially when, as is often the case, the leader skews distribution of 
limited infrastructure and government benefits to favor his own ethnic 
group at the expense of other groups.91   
B.  Colonial Attitudes toward Development in Senegambia 
Development is the broad process of using human and natural 
resources (people and things) to produce more wealth and build a better 
system of production92 in an attempt to improve the quality of life of 
                                                          
unlike in many other states in Africa, ethnic relations among Senegal’s major ethnic 
groups, including those of the state’s leaders, “are marked by social harmony.” Id. at 
2–3. Various reasons accounting for this harmony, according to scholars, include: “the 
nation-building policies of the first head of state, Léopold Sedar Senghor, the impact 
of the Wolof language, intermarriage, the cosmopolitanism of the city of Dakar . . . a 
tradition of democracy and Pan-Africanism[,]” and the mellowing influence of Islam 
made possible by its expression through brotherhoods. Id. at 3.  
88. ALEXANDER KEESE, ETHNICITY AND THE COLONIAL STATE: FINDING AND 
REPRESENTING GROUP IDENTIFICATION IN A COASTAL WEST AFRICAN AND GLOBAL 
PERSPECTIVE: 1850-1960 151 (2015) (suggesting that Jawara is Wolof). 
89. Yahya Jammeh (former President of The Gambia), Background 
Information, ACCESS GAMBIA, http://www.accessgambia.com/information/yahya-
jammeh.html (last visited May 3, 2017). 
90. See Gambia: Gambia’s UDP Says It Has Nominated a “Fulani Real Estate 
Businessman” as a Presidential Candidate!, FREEDOM NEWSPAPER ONLINE (Feb. 10, 
2017), http://www.freedomnewspaper.com/gambia-gambias-udp-says-it-has-
nominated-a-fulani-real-estate-businessman-as-a-presidential-candidate/. The 
acronym UDP stands for the United Democratic Party, a coalition of seven opposition 
parties that fielded Barrow as their common candidate for president in the election 
against longtime ruler Yahya Jammeh, held Dec. 1, 2016, that Jammeh lost, scoring 
37 percent of all votes cast to Barrow’s 45 percent.  Lea Albrecht, Adama Barrow: 
The Gambia’s Next President, DEUTSCHE WELLE (Jan. 20, 2017), 
http://www.dw.com/en/adama-barrow-the-gambias-next-president/a-36620649.  
91. See generally GODFREY MWAKIKAGILE, ETHNIC POLITICS IN KENYA AND 
NIGERIA (2001). Cf. STEPHEN SNOOK ET AL., supra note 87, at 2 (pointing out that in 
Senegal, “[u]nlike in other parts of Africa, ethnic tensions have had little influence on 
politics.”).   
92. DAVIDSON, supra note 9, at 224.  
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citizens.93 It is “the process by which people create and recreate 
themselves and their life circumstances to realize higher levels of 
civilization in accordance with their own choices and values.”94 
Scholars go as far as to equate development with democracy.95 As 
Professor Ake seminally argued, “[D]emocracy is part of what 
development is about . . . .”96 Ake dispelled the notion that 
development was positively correlated with the type of authoritarianism 
practiced in newly industrialized countries of East Asia, such as China, 
Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea, and Taiwan.97 Instead, “because 
democracy is part of the very meaning of political development . . . [a] 
case for authoritarianism’s being positively correlated to development 
does not really arise . . . .”98  
The essence of this definition of development is that, though often 
conveniently measured in material economic terms, all development 
ranges well beyond economic growth to critically embrace political and 
social dimensions.99 Consistent with this larger notion, development 
took place in precolonial Africa,100 some under political structures 
different from latter-day colonial institutions.101 Precolonial Africa 
consisted of centralized political systems, decentralized political 
systems, and in-between political systems that combined features of the 
centralized and decentralized systems.102 The Wolof people utilized a 
                                                          
93. F.I. Kabuya, Development Ideas in Post-Independence: Sub-Saharan 
Africa, 3 J. DEV. & AGRIC. ECONS. 2 (Jan. 2011).  
94. AKE, supra note 5, at 125.  
95. See id. passim.  
96. Id. at 158.   
97. Id. at 94, 127–29, 156–68.   
98. Id. at 127. Ake explains that, following independence, many African leaders 
chose to inherit, unchanged, the political system bequeathed to them by the departing 
colonial authorities, rather than transform that system “in accordance with the 
democratic aspirations of the nationalist movement.” Id. at 116.  
99. See DAVIDSON, supra note 9, at 225 (highlighting several key requirements 
embedded in the process of development); see also AKE, supra note 5, at 16.  
100. See DAVIDSON, supra note 9, at 265.  
101. See WALTER RODNEY, HOW EUROPE UNDERDEVELOPED AFRICA 69 (1981) 
(discussing “[h]ow Africa Developed before the Coming of the Europeans—Up to the 
Fifteenth Century.”). See also id. at 73–92 (commenting on Africa’s contribution to 
European capitalist development during the precolonial period). 
102. See Charles Lumpkins, Precolonial African Politics and Government, 
PENN STATE UNIVERSITY COLLEGE OF LIBERAL ARTS, 
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centralized system, ruled by a king (called burba, meaning ruler) who 
exercised both political and religious power.103 At the height of its 
reign, circa the fourteen century, the Wolof Empire developed satellite 
states, most notably Cayor.104 In contrast, the Diolas were egalitarian 
people who rejected and still reject centralized authority.105 The same 
is true of the Mandinkos whose political system consisted of nominal 
kingdoms rooted in villages, and governed by elders.106 Mandinko 
“kings” were non-absolute leaders who shared taxes they collected with 
village heads and made major decisions, such as declarations of war, 
that were subject to approval by a council of elders from leading 
families in the kingdom.107 An example of a system in-between these 
two types is the Mandinkos, an egalitarian people, whose origins date 
back to Manding (Kangaba), one of the states of ancient Mali Empire.108   
                                                          
http://elearning.la.psu.edu/afam/100/lesson-2-part1/african-roots-of-african-
american-life-under-slavery/pre-colonial-african-politics-and-government (last 
visited Apr. 12, 2017); Otumfuo Osei Tutu II, Traditional Sys. of Governance and the 
Mod. St, Keynote Address at the Fourth Afr. Dev. F., Addis Ababa, Ethiopia (Oct. 12, 
2004),  http://dspace.africaportal.org/jspui/bitstream/123456789/10101/1/ 
Traditional%20Systems%20of%20Governance%20and%20the%20Modern%20Stat
e.pdf?1; Module Twenty Three, Activity Two: History of Senegal, EXPLORING AFRICA, 
http://exploringafrica.matrix.msu.edu/module-twenty-three-activity-two/ (last visited 
May 3, 2017). 
103. Wolof Empire, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA (1998), 
https://www.britannica.com/place/Wolof-empire. 
104. Id.  
105. See supra notes 62–64 and accompanying text. 
106. The Mandinko of The Gambia, 12 CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS FOUNDATION 
(2000), http://www.crf-usa.org/bill-of-rights-in-action/bria-12-1-c-the-mandinko-of-
the-gambia. 
107. Id. This feature calls to mind the “king in every man” republicanism of the 
Igbo people in present-day Nigeria who organized themselves into more than 2,000 
kingless villages. See RICHARD N. HENDERSON, THE KING IN EVERY MAN: 
EVOLUTIONARY TRENDS IN ONITSHA IBO SOCIETY AND CULTURE, passim (1972); 
ELIZABETH ISICHEI, THE IBO PEOPLE AND THE EUROPEANS: THE GENESIS OF A 
RELATIONSHIP—TO 1906 47 (1973).  
108. (Mandingo) Mandinka Tribe in Gambia, ACCESS GAMBIA, 
http://www.accessgambia.com/information/mandinka.html (last visited May 3, 
2017). Outside Senegambia, an example of such in-between governmental 
arrangements occurred in some parts of Yorubaland in present-day Nigeria that were 
“centralized with some measure of republicanism.” Mojeed Olujinmi A. Alabi, Law 
Making in Pre-Colonial Yorubaland, in THE YORUBA IN TRANSITION: HISTORY, 
VALUES, AND MODERNITY 112, 122 (Toyin Falola & Ann Genova, eds., 2006).  
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Compared to precolonial Africa, little development took place in 
colonial Africa, including the areas known today as Senegal and 
Gambia. Wherever it existed in Africa, colonialism was “imposed by 
violence, and maintained by its potential capacity for violence.”109 As 
a corollary, rather than being vehicles for galvanizing development, 
colonial institutions were primarily “structures of exploitation, 
despotism, and degradation.”110 European colonizers had no real plan 
to develop their African colonies beyond utilizing their raw materials 
for European industrialization.111 France in particular did a poor job 
integrating the Casamance into the rest of Senegal, to the detriment of 
nation-building in the post-independence period.112  
Next to the territories that became Senegal and Gambia, “[t]he 
logical thing for any pragmatic state-building enterprise would have 
been to” make the two separate territories one country.113 French and 
British colonial authorities recognized the impediments Gambia’s 
location posed, as a semi-enclave within Senegal, to the progress of the 
two countries.114 Both colonizers made feeble attempts to fix the 
                                                          
109. ELIZABETH ISICHEI, A HISTORY OF THE IGBO PEOPLE 119 (1976). See also 
Philip C. Aka, The Military, Globalization, and Human Rights in Africa, 18 J. HUM. 
RTS. 361, 379 (2002) (observing that “[t]he entire architecture of colonial rule . . . was 
built and maintained solely and completely on naked force designed to crush any and 
every ‘native’ resistance to external domination.”).  
110. Robert Fatton, Jr., Liberal Democracy in Africa, 105 POL. SCI. Q. 455, 457 
(1990).  
111. See, e.g., D.K. Fieldhouse, Colonialism: Economic Aspects, 
INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES (2008), 
http://www.encyclopedia.com/history/modern-europe/ancient-history-middle-ages-
and-feudalism/colonialism.  
112. See supra note 61 and accompanying text; see also Government, in 
NIGERIA: A COUNTRY STUDY (Helen Chapin Metz, ed., 1991) (A similar story took 
place in Nigeria where, through their policy of indirect rule, British colonial 
authorities perpetrated the separate development of the northern and southern portions 
of the country, with negative consequences for political stability decades after 
independence.).  
113. Nicodemus Fru Awasom, The Sene-Gambia in Historical and 
Contemporary Perspectives, in NATION-STATES AND THE CHALLENGES OF 
REGIONAL INTEGRATION IN WEST AFRICA: THE CASE OF THE GAMBIA 47 (Siga 
Fatima Jagne, ed., 2010). 
114. See id. For Senegal, an independent Gambia would obstruct 
communication between northern and southern Senegal and minimize utilization of 
the navigable River Gambia as a route into the interior as far as Mali. In this sense, 
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problem, but neither went far enough. During the second half of the 
nineteenth century, there was a proposal, ultimately unsuccessful, 
aimed at unifying the region, involving France trading another West 
African holding for Gambia.115 There were also informal talks designed 
to correct the problem that, in the assessment of one analyst, “focused 
on association between the two territories as a technical rather than a 
political matter.”116  
The overall result was colonial overlords, in important respects, 
joined hands to bring Senegal and Gambia together.117 However, they 
did not work equally or collaboratively to fix the “banana in the teeth 
of Senegal” problem they created by integrating the two territories 
before handing over political control.118 Under the concept of self-
development “people either develop themselves, or they do not develop 
at all.”119 In other words, little development in the real sense took place 
under colonial rule in Senegambia or any other portion of Africa.120   
                                                          
Gambia prevents Senegal from realizing its full economic potentials. For Gambia, its 
location inside Senegal and small size create a dependence on Senegal for realizing 
its economic development—and security.  
115. Richmond, supra note 67, at 177. 
116. Awasom, supra note 113, at 47–48.  
117. See supra Part II.A. (outlining the basic data relating to Gambia and 
Senegal).  
118. Jackson & Rosberg, supra note 17, at 14. In their important work, 
Professors Jackson and Rosberg maintained that “[a]t independence . . . there 
were . . . very few traditional African states to whom sovereignty could revert. 
Consequently, there was little choice but to establish independence in terms of the 
colonial entities.” They added in a footnote that “French West Africa[,] rather than its 
constituent units—Senegal, Mali Upper Volta, Ivory Coast, etc.—could have been 
one state had Africans been able to agree to it; Nigeria could have been more than 
one.” Id. at 14, n.14. This is implausible. The colonial overlords who created this 
problem in the first place were in a much better position to fix it than the nationalist 
leaders preoccupied at independence with preserving the fragile unity they garnered 
from the decolonization struggle, given the ethnic awareness that was a byproduct of 
that struggle. 
119. DAVIDSON, supra note 9, at 265.  
120. RODNEY, supra note 101, at 93–146 (commenting on factors, including the 
slave trade, at the root of African underdevelopment); id. at 147–202 (commenting on 
aspects of Africa’s contribution to the capitalist development of Europe, such as 
expatriation of African surplus, to the detriment of the continent); and id. at 203–82 
(portraying colonialism in itself, including “education for underdevelopment,” and 
“development by contradiction,” as “a system for under developing Africa.”).  
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Given its scarcity during the colonial era, a hunger for development 
gripped Africa following independence. This was dictated, as Julius 
Nyerere advised, not just by the need to run while others walked.121 But, 
there was also a need to augment the region’s social services that 
received inadequate attention during the colonial period, like healthcare 
and education.122 However, many of the economies bequeathed to the 
new states lacked the capacity needed for any development, whether 
political, economic, or social. Historian Basil Davidson delicately 
summarized the scenario:  
Africa’s economies had been small in scale. They suited the needs 
of many hundreds of self-supplying and mostly rural communities. 
There had been no industrial revolution, no reliance on the manufacture 
of machine-made goods, and no need for imports of good. Being self-
reliant, Africans were sheltered from the shocks and strains of the world 
market and its fluctuating prices. Now, in the new period of worldwide 
industrialism, all that was changed. There could be no going back to the 
past.123  
One way around this problem was regional economic integration. 
This acted as a tool by pooling resources and creating larger markets 
that were necessary to stimulate production while growing trade and 
investment.124 Arguably this was part of the impetuses behind the 
formation of the ECA.125 A pan-Africanist motif signified the 
dedication to a “larger unity transcending ethnic and national 
differences” and stimulated the formation of the Organization for 
African Unity in 1963.126 But there was also an economic objective at 
                                                          
121. See DAVIDSON, supra note 9.  
122. Id. at 218.  See also ELIZABETH ISICHEI, A HISTORY OF THE IGBO PEOPLE 
199 (1976) (As the Nigerian historian Elizabeth Isichei poignantly notes in her work 
on Igbo history, “[t]he important thing to the historian of Igboland is the sobering 
reflection that after half a century of colonial rule and mission, over 80 percent of the 
population was illiterate.”). 
123. DAVIDSON, supra note 9, at 218.  
124. African Dev. Bank Group, Integration Represents Significant 




125. See supra notes 11–12.  
126. OAU Charter, preamble, May 26, 1963, 
http://www.au2002.gov.za/docs/key_oau/oau_charter.pdf. The organization 
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work. Through economic integration, the continent’s fragmented 
economies stand a better chance of being transmuted “into one strong, 
robust, diversified[,] and resilient economy[,]”127 that is “supported by 
a first-class trans-boundary infrastructure; a highly educated, flexible 
and mobile workforce; financial capital that is highly mobile; sound 
health facilities; and peace and security.”128 
III. THE SENEGAMBIA CONFEDERATION AND THE LOCUST YEARS OF 
AFRICAN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
A.  Particulars of the Union Agreement 
In February of 1982, Senegal and Gambia entered into the 
Senegambia Confederation,129 an agreement designed to strengthen 
longstanding political and economic ties between the two states that 
predated their respective independences.130 Specifically, the 
                                                          
metamorphosed into the African Union, effective 2000. See Constitutive Act of the 
Africa Union (2000), http://www.au.int/en/sites/default/files/ 
ConstitutiveAct_EN.pdf; AU in a Nutshell, AFRICAN UNION, 
http://www.au.int/en/about/nutshell.  
127. Joe Atta-Mensah II, Africa’s Quest for Deeper Integration, AFRICA UP 
CLOSE (Nov. 8, 2013), https://africaupclose.wilsoncenter.org/africas-quest-for-
deeper-integration/.  
128. Id.  
129. See Agreement Between The Republic of the Gambia and the Republic of 
Senegal Concerning the Establishment of the Senegambia Confederation, Clause 1 
(Dec. 17, 1981), http://www.gambia.dk/senegambia_confederation.html (indicating 
that “[b]y this Agreement a Confederation of the Republic of The Gambia and the 
Republic of Senegal is constituted with the name of the Senegambia Confederation”) 
[hereinafter Senegambia Confederation Agreement]. The name Senegambia has a 
long history in the literature on Senegal-Gambia relations. As early as 1765, the 
British used the term to refer to their settlements in the two areas, Saint Louis and 
Gorée Island in Senegal and James Island in Gambia. The term remained in use until 
1783 when, under the Treaty of Versailles, Britain ceded Saint Louis to France. It 
came into more vogue or usage beginning in 1982 following the union between 
Senegal and Gambia. See Senegambia Origins, ACCESS GAMBIA, 
http://www.accessgambia.com/information/senegambia-meaning.html (last visited 
Apr. 12, 2017).  
130. See JEGGAN C. SENGHOR, THE POLITICS OF SENEGAMBIAN INTEGRATION, 
1958-1974 15 (2008); Jeggan C. Senghor, Senegalo-Gambian Relations: Continuities 
in the Past and Future, PAMBAZUKA NEWS (May 8, 2012), 
http://www.pambazuka.org/governance/senegalo-%E2%80%93-gambian-relations-
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Confederation was designed to (1) integrate armed security forces, 
promote economic and monetary cooperation, and coordinate policies 
in a number of areas including foreign policy and communications;131 
and (2) “establish an institutional framework, consistent with national 
sovereignty and democratic principles, within which these [goals] may 
be gradually realized.”132 It was the brainchild of Abdou Diouf of 
Senegal and Dawda K. Jawara of Gambia,133 then leaders of their 
respective countries.134 The Confederation reflected the substance of 
the Kaur Declaration, an announcement made by the two leaders on 
December 12, 1981.135   
Entrance into the Senegambia Confederation took place in the 
aftermath of a coup in Gambia that Senegalese troops put down.136 The 
                                                          
continuities-past-and-future (chronicling six phases in Gambian-Senegalese relations, 
beginning with the first phase from 1958 to 1967; Senghor points out the Senegambia 
Confederation is phase three of these relations).   
131. Senegambia Confederation Agreement, supra note 129, preamble.  
132. Id.  
133. Jawara led Gambia from 1962 to 1994, while Diouf led Senegal from 1981 
to 2000. For biographies of the two leaders, see Sir Dawda Kairaba Jawara, President 
of The Gambia, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, https://www.britannica.com/ 
biography/Dawda-Kairaba-Jawara; Abdou Diouf, President of Senegal, 
ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, https://www.britannica.com/biography/Abdou-Diouf 
(last visited Apr. 12, 2017).   
134. See Senegambia Confederation Agreement, supra note 129. 
135. The declaration is named after the city in Senegal where the announcement 
was made. Details on this declaration are provided in OMAR A. TOURAY, THE GAMBIA 
AND THE WORLD: A HISTORY OF THE FOREIGN POLICY OF AFRICA’S SMALLEST 
STATE, 1965-1999 108-09 (2000).  
136. See Hassoum Ceesay, 1981 Coup: Tragedy that Befalls The Gambia, 
DAILY OBSERVER (Feb. 17, 2015), http://archives.chicagotribune.com/ 
1981/07/31/page/6/article/coup-in-gambia-reported-quelled; Andrew F. Clark, 
Gambia, The: Relations with Senegal, WORLDHISTORY BIZ (Feb. 10, 2015), 
http://www.worldhistory.biz/sundries/48777-gambia-the-relations-with-
senegal.html; D.L. Chandler, Gambia President Dawda Jawara Ousted from Power 
on This Day in 1994, FACE2FACE AFRICA (July 22, 2014), 
https://face2faceafrica.com/article/dawda-jawara-the-gambia; Steve Fishman, 
Gambia: Tiny Silver of a Country Still Shaking after Coup Attempt, CHRISTIAN SCI. 
MONITOR (Aug. 14, 1981), http://www.csmonitor.com/1981/0814/081452.html; 
Associated Press, Coup in Gambia Reported Quelled, CHI. TRIB. (July 31, 1981), 
http://archives.chicagotribune.com/1981/07/31/page/6/article/coup-in-gambia-
reported-quelled. See also Pranay B. Gupte, Gambia Enters Union with Senegal on 
Wary Note, NY TIMES (Feb. 1, 1982), http://archives.chicagotribune.com/ 
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agreement complemented, rather than displaced, membership of the 
contracting parties in existing international organizations, including 
ECOWAS.137 Moreover, the union was driven by hard realities on the 
ground, including an awareness that the two countries “constitute[d] a 
single people divided into two States by the vicissitudes of History.”138   
The union was greeted with considerable euphoria in the 
contracting countries. Gambian President Jawara praised the agreement 
as a major step in the movement toward continental unity in Africa.139 
For his part, Senegalese President Diouf enthused, in words that 
paralleled the language of the agreement, that “[a]round the world, 
everyone knows that but for the vicissitudes of colonial history, we, 
Senegalese and Gambians, would today be citizens of one and the same 
State, for in every respect, we constitute a single people with the same 
destiny and with identical aspirations.”140   
The Confederation was headed by a President, the “President of the 
Republic of Senegal,” who was also commander-in-chief of the two 
countries’ armies. The Vice-President was the “President of the 
Republic of The Gambia,”141 who retained his position as commander-
in-chief of the Gambian army.142 Institutions of the Confederation 
included the Defense and Security Council, the Council of Ministers, 
                                                          
1981/07/31/page/6/article/coup-in-gambia-reported-quelled (Ironically, the union 
agreement fueled suspicion among critics that, with its political pre-eminence and 
much stronger military might, Senegal sought to intervene militarily in Gambia under 
the guise of broader cooperation. For its part, Senegal maintained that its goal was 
driven by functionalism, designed to engender mutual trust and habits of cooperation 
between two neighboring governments.) For a description on functionalism and 
international organizations, see Mark F. Imber, Functionalism: International 
Organizations, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, https://www.britannica.com/topic/ 
functionalism-international-organizations.  
137. See Senegambia Confederation Agreement, supra note 129, preamble 
(indicating that the contracting parties are “[r]espectful of” various international law 
agreements and commitments, including the Lagos Treaty of 1975 setting up 
ECOWAS). For more information on ECOWAS, see supra note 10.   
138. Senegambia Confederation Agreement, supra note 129, preamble.  
139. Baboucarr Camara & Alieu Ceesay, The Senegambia Confederation: The 
Rise and Fall of the Unification, DAILY OBSERVER (Feb. 17, 2015), 
https://observergm.com/the-senegambia-confederation-the-rise-and-fall-of-the-
unification/.  
140. Id.  
141. Senegambia Confederation Agreement, supra note 129, Clause 6. 
142. Id. at Clause 8.  
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and the Confederal Parliament.143 The Defense and Security Council 
“comprise[d] the President and Vice-President of the Confederation and 
such other persons as the President, in agreement with the Vice-
President of the Confederation, may determine.”144 The President of 
Senegal, who doubled as the President of the Confederation,” headed 
this Council.145 “[I]n agreement with the Vice-President,” the President 
of the Confederation appointed members of the Council of Ministers.146 
Regarding the Confederal Parliament, two-thirds were selected by the 
Senegalese National Parliament from among its members, while one-
third was selected by the Gambian House of Representatives from 
among its members.147 Additionally, both the President and Vice 
President could submit to the vote of the Confederal Parliament “any 
matter of social, economic, or financial interest to the 
Confederation.”148 Under the agreement, when the Confederation 
would conclude a treaty, the President of the Confederation negotiated 
that treaty “in agreement with the Vice-President.”149 Then, the 
President ratified any negotiated treaty, subject to authorization by the 
Confederal Parliament and enactment by the individual Confederated 
States.150 
On September 30, 1989, the Confederation ended seven and a half 
years after it began.151 Its twin goals of policy integration in various 
areas and establishing an institutional framework for the gradual 
realization of the stipulated goals were far from achieved.152 The cause 
                                                          
143. Id. at Clauses 6-9 (President and Vice-President); Clause 9 (Defense and 
Security Council); Clause 10 (Council of Ministers); Clauses 11-14 (Confederal 
Parliament).  
144. Id. at Clause 9.  
145. Id.  
146. Id. at Clause 10.  
147. Id. at Clause 11.  
148. Id. at Clause 12.  
149. Id. at Clause 16.  
150. Id.  
151. See TOURAY, supra note 135, at 115. Cf. Senghor, Senegalo-Gambian 
Relations: Continuities in the Past and Future, supra note 130 (putting the date of 
death as Aug. 29, 1989).  
152. See Senegambia Confederation Agreement, supra note 129, preamble. 
Little literature exists on the operation of the union agreement before its dissolution 
in 1989—e.g., the operation of the Confederal Parliament over the 7½-year timeline, 
including the number and identity of laws it issued, among other details. Some 
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of its death was “serious differences in a number of areas, particularly 
in perceptions and expectations as to the end-goal of the new order.”153 
One of the serious differences was Gambia’s demand for rotation of the 
Confederation presidency, which created friction with a Senegalese 
leadership already riled at the slow pace of integration.154  
A second was differences in trade policies. Senegal maintained 
trade barriers that provided preferential treatment for French goods 
imported into the country, whereas Gambia had practically no trade 
obstacles.155 These opposing trade policies fueled a large black market 
around the Senegal-Gambia border, which brought cheaper 
manufactured goods into Senegal.156 For example, the Senegalese 
government operated a voucher system known as chit for peanuts, an 
agricultural mainstay of Senegalese economy, whereby Senegalese 
peanut farmers waited three months to get cash.157 Many farmers who 
chose not to wait for this delayed voucher system smuggled their 
products to Banjul, where the Gambian government paid in cash.158 The 
result was that by 1990, about 20 percent of the Gambian peanut market 
was from smuggled Senegalese crops.159  
                                                          
exceptions can be made on this point. See, e.g., TOURAY, supra note 135, at 107–18 
(providing extensive discussion on “[t]he birth of the Senegambia confederation”); 
Camara & Ceesay, supra note 139 (enumerating eight protocols the contracting 
parties unveiled between 1982 and 1983). However, none of this literature included 
any work of any of the confederation’s institutions, such as the Confederal Parliament. 
The seeming spotlight on this institution is justified by the criticalness of an “effective 
government, with centralized administrative and legislative organs” in the definition 
of an empirical state able to perform the de facto functions of a national government 
exercising effective control (through laws, policies, and regulations) over the people, 
organizations, and activities within its territorial jurisdiction. Jackson & Rosberg, 
supra note 17, at 5.  
153. Senghor, Senegalo-Gambian Relations: Continuities in the Past and 
Future, supra note 130.  
154. TOURAY, supra note 135, at 115. See also Nancy Benjamin et al., 
Informality, Trade Policies, and Smuggling in West Africa, 30 BORDERLINE STUD. 
391–94 (2015); Stephen S. Golub & Ahmadou Aly Mbaye, National Trade Policies 
and Smuggling in Africa: The Case of The Gambia and Senegal, 37 WORLD DEV. 595, 
598 (2009).  
155. Richmond, supra note 67, at 185.  
156. Id. 
157. Id. at 186.  
158. Id.  
159. Id.  
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A third serious difference that caused the Confederation to end was 
sparse support, and much less enthusiasm, for integration. The Gambian 
public saw little economic benefit in a political union with Senegal.160 
Proceeds from the border trade arising from the black market formed 
part of the mainstay of Gambia’s fledgling economy.161 Therefore, 
contrary to Senegalese authorities who viewed the border trade as 
illegal smuggling, many Gambians perceived it as lawful “re-export” of 
imported goods.162  
Fourth and finally, while one of the goals of the Confederation was 
the adoption of a common currency,163 a serious difference was that 
many Gambians were unwilling to embrace a new monetary 
arrangement.164 They did not want an arrangement that would lead to a 
replacement of their currency, the dalasi, tied to the British pound 
sterling, by the Senegalese currency, the franc (the C.F.A.), similarly 
tied to the French franc.165   
To recapitulate, the union experiment between Senegal and Gambia 
failed because of Gambia’s “unwillingness to compromise its economic 
and political independence” vis-à-vis Senegal’s “refusal to continue to 
assume Gambian security without corresponding economic and 
political concessions.”166 Senegal viewed the political relationship “as 
a first step toward closer integration of the two states probably leading 
to a federation and ultimately leading to a unitary state of 
Senegambia.”167 However, Gambia merely viewed the relationship as 
                                                          
160. See Gupte, supra note 136.  
161. Id. Back to 1964, a United Nations report anticipated this problem and 
proposed solution for Gambia by way of a qualified customs union. PETER ROBSON, 
INTEGRATION, DEVELOPMENT, AND EQUITY: ECONOMIC INTEGRATION IN WEST 
AFRICA 134–35 (2010). See also Lucie Colvin Phillips et al., The Senegambia 
Confederation, Inst. Dev. Anthropology, Binghamton, NY, USAID (Feb. 1987), 
http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PNAAY711.pdf (study sponsored by the U.S. Agency 
for Int’l Dev. in 1987 that focused on this same issue).  
162. Gupte, supra note 136.  
163. Id.   
164. Id. 
165. Id.  
166. TOURAY, supra note 135, at 118.  
167. Senghor, THE POLITICS OF SENEGAMBIAN INTEGRATION, supra note 130, 
at 256 (opinion of then Gambian President Dawda K. Jawara).  
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“an expression of the very special relationship existing between the two 
countries.”168   
Each state felt a national security threat that the Confederation 
agreement was designed to cure.169 For Gambia, it was territorial 
integrity, whose exigency was underscored by the unsuccessful 1981 
coup.170 For Senegal, it was stopping financial losses Senegalese 
leaders blamed on Gambia’s lax system of custom duties, the answer to 
which Senegalese leaders believed lay in a larger economic and 
eventual political union with Gambia.171 To be sure, there were security 
considerations embedded in Senegalese calculations. For example, 
Senegal authorities worried about Gambia becoming a safe haven for 
Senegalese dissidents, including activists in Casamance agitating for 
independence.172 However, for Senegal more than for Gambia, an 
overriding motivation was economic security.173  
B. The Measure as a Product of the Locust Years of African 
Economic Development  
The Senegambia Confederation was one of the boldest moves 
outside of economic integration to create a political structure for 
development in Africa. It was a culmination of efforts by Senegal and 
Gambia to fashion a tool to facilitate cooperation. In the 1960s, the two 
countries commissioned a United Nations report to study the possible 
                                                          
168. Id.  
169. See TOURAY, supra note 135, at 100.  
170. Id. at 99-100.  
171. Id. at 100.  
172. See, e.g., FALL, supra note 35, at 3 (pointing out that Gambian territories 
“have been used by [Casamance] rebels to launch attacks on the Senegalese Army 
posts and Casamance’s populations.”); 1982-89 Senegambia Confederation, GLOBAL 
SECURITY, http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/africa/gm-history-09.htm 
(disclosing that in the wake of the Confederation’s demise, “Senegal accused The 
Gambia of allowing the secessionists to use its territory as a transit point for Libyan 
and Iraqi weapons, providing a meeting point for representatives of the MFDC,” 
arrowhead of the Casamance rebellion, see supra note 55 and accompanying text, 
“serving as a base from which the military wing of the MFDC could launch its attacks 
on the Lower Casamance,” to name these charges). 
173. TOURAY, supra note 135, at 100. 
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plans and benefits of their unification.174 It was the second move 
involving Senegal, after the short-lived Mali Federation of 1959-
1960,175 a union of eight French colonies in Africa that was left over 
from French West Africa.176 The federation by France dated back to 
1895 and included: Mauritania, Senegal, Mali, Guinea, Côte d’Ivoire, 
Burkina Faso, Benin, and Niger.177 Coming after these French colonial 
initiatives, the Senegambia Confederation was a pragmatic union based 
on mutual security interests that, for all its seeming brevity, was one of 
the longest-lived African unions of its time. For one thing, it outlasted 
the Union of Independent African States (UIAS) of 1959 initially 
between Ghana and Guinea that Mali joined in 1960.178 The UIAS was 
dissolved in 1963 after only four years in existence.179 Most 
importantly, the measure was a product of the locust years of African 
                                                          
174. Richmond, supra note 67, at 178; Arnold Hughes & Janet Lewis, Beyond 
Francophonie?: The Senegambia Confederation in Retrospect, in STATE AND 
SOCIETY IN FRANCOPHONE AFRICA SINCE INDEPENDENCE 229 (Anthony Kirk-Greene 
& Daniel Bach, eds., 1995).  
175. See Alistair Boddy-Evans, The Federation of Mali, ABOUT EDUCATION 
(Jan. 20, 2017), http://africanhistory.about.com/od/mali/a/FedMali.htm; Donn M. 
Kurtz, Political Integration in Africa: The Mali Federation, 8 J. MOD. AFR. STUD. 
405-24 (1970), http://www.jstor.org/stable/158851; WILLIAM J. FOLTZ, FROM 
FRENCH WEST AFRICA TO THE MALI FEDERATION (1965). 
176. See generally ALDRICH, supra note 43; FOLTZ, supra note 175.  
177. See generally ALDRICH, supra note 43; FOLTZ, supra note 175. Many of 
these states bore different names during the colonial period that they changed after 
gaining independence. Mali was named French Soudan, Guinea was called French 
Guinea, Côte d’Ivoire was named Ivory Coast, Burkina Faso was called Upper Volta, 
and Benin was named Dahomey. See Angela Thompsell, The Colonial Names of 
African States: Modern African Nations Compared with Their Colonial Names, 
THOUGHT CO. (Feb. 4, 2017), https://www.thoughtco.com/colonial-names-of-african-
states-43755.  
178.  The initiative generated a flurry of commentaries in academic and popular 
forums, including: Mark W. DeLancey, The Ghana-Guinea-Mali Union: A 
Bibliographic Essay, 9 AFR. STUD. BULL. 35–51 (1966); 3 Nations in African Union, 
CHI. DAILY DEFENDER 4 (July 3, 1961); Ghana, Guinea, and Mali Inaugurate New 
Union, WASH. POST A9 (July 2, 1961); 3 African Lands Take Unity Step: Ghana, 
Guinea, and Mali Sign Charter for New Grouping NY TIMES 9 (Apr. 30, 1961); 
Russell Howe, Ghana, Guinea Build Federation Designed to Lure Other States, 
WASH. POST A4 (May 23, 1959); The Birth of UIAS, WASH. POST A16 (May 6, 1959); 
and Thomas F. Brady, New West Africa Union Sealed by Heads of Ghana and Guinea, 
NY TIMES 2 (May 2, 1959). 
179.  See DeLancey, supra note 178.  
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economic development hallmarked by unrelieved material distress that 
set the region negatively apart from the rest of the international 
community;180 it took place during the “lost decade” of the 1980s when 
Africa lagged hopelessly behind the rest of the world in many policy 
areas, including health, education, and general living standards.181   
For all of its benefits, the Senegambia Confederation agreement 
was a pact of severely unequal partners. By population alone, at the time 
of the agreement in 1982, Senegal had over nine times Gambia’s 
population.182 Senegal’s population comprised nearly 6 million people 
versus Gambia’s population of a little over 648,000 people.183 The 
disparity in population size led some critics even from Senegal to liken 
the agreement to an annexation disguised as expanded security 
cooperation.184 There were indications that Gambians and their leaders 
feared losing power, identity, and being utterly dominated by the 
Senegalese.185 The unequal-ness of the Confederation was a process 
maintained solely by support from elites from both countries. The 
Confederation had little popular or grassroots support from citizens 
from either country, especially those from Gambia who vehemently 
opposed it.186 Some observers took the view that but for the 1981 
military coup that Senegalese troops put down, Gambian leader Jawara 
would most likely not have entered into the merger agreement.187 With 
the initial threat of domination dissipated, the union experiment died as 
quickly as it had begun.  
                                                          
180.  See supra note 14 and accompanying text.  
181.  See supra note 13 and accompanying text.  
182. See the figures for the two countries under the year 1982 in POPULATION 
PYRAMIDS OF THE WORLD FROM 1950 TO 2010, 
https://populationpyramid.net/senegal/1982/ (last visited Mar. 11, 2017); and 
POPULATION PYRAMIDS OF THE WORLD FROM 1950 TO 2010, 
https://populationpyramid.net/gambia/1982/ (last visited Mar. 11, 2017). 
183.  See id.  
184.  See Gupte, supra note 136.  
185.  Hughes & Lewis, supra note 174, at 236.  
186.  Id. at 236–37; see also supra notes 160–62 and accompanying text. 
187. Cf. Jackson & Rosberg, supra note 17, at 12 (speculating that the episode 
so “undermined the security of the Gambian government” as to impel it to enter the 
agreement) with Arnold Hughes, The Collapse of the Senegambian Confederation, 30 
J. COMMONWEALTH & COMP. POLITICS 200 (Jul. 1992) (opining that “the confidence 
of the Gambian government recovered as memories of the coup attempt of 1981 
receded and its political authority was reestablished with the electorate.”). 
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Given the bonds of geography and ethnic affinity that connect 
Senegal and Gambia, the impetus for some kind of integrated union 
dates back to the period before independence.188 The result was the 
signing of a Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation between the two 
countries in January of 1991.189 In the changed atmosphere of the 
relationship between Senegal and Gambia after 1989, a successful 
military coup took place in 1994 which finally brought the nearly three 
decade leadership of Sir Dawda K. Jawara to an end,190 partly because 
the Senegalese leadership saw no point in intervening militarily this 
time to save Jawara.  
IV. TOWARD APPROPRIATE STRUCTURES FOR GOVERNANCE AND 
DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA IN THE 21ST CENTURY: FOUR TAKEAWAYS 
(OR “SOLUTIONS”) FROM THE CASE STUDY 
There are four takeaways or “solutions” that may be gleaned from 
the preceding case study on the Senegambia Confederation. The first 
revolves around the need to redraw Africa’s artificial boundaries in 
order to promote development. However, this could take a long time 
during which time frame development must take place within the 
present boundaries, whether those borders are natural or artificial (i.e. 
arbitrarily determined by former colonial powers).191 Compared to this 
first solution, the other three takeaways are less grand. These midrange 
measures are: political engineering, which is necessary but by itself 
insufficient; political engineering, which must be coupled with cultural 
engineering; and political performance, which must be synchronized 
with the preceding two factors. In other words, the three midrange 
solutions must occur in tandem, rather than sequentially.   
                                                          
188.  See SENGHOR, THE POLITICS OF SENEGAMBIAN INTEGRATION, supra note 
130, passim.  
189.  TOURAY, supra note 135, at 116.  
190.  Howard W. French, In Gambia, New Coup Follows Old Pattern, NY 
TIMES (Aug. 28, 1994), http://www.nytimes.com/1994/08/28/world/in-gambia-new-
coup-follows-old-pattern.html. See John A. Wiseman & Elizabeth Vidler, The July 
1994 Coup D’Etat in the Gambia: The End of An Era?, 84 COMMONWEALTH J. INT’L 
AFF. 53–65 (2008), for a critical analysis on the coup. 
191.  See supra note 6 and accompanying text.  
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A.  Redraw African’s Artificial Boundaries 
The first takeaway in the journey to fashioning appropriate 
structures for development in Africa is to redraw the continent’s 
arbitrarily fixed boundaries to make them more suited for the work of 
development. The simple logic to this solution—and its 
attractiveness—lies in the fact that, since the European colonizers 
created these unnatural boundaries, all that is needed to fix the problem 
is to redraw these boundaries. This grand or overarching solution, 
however, assumes too much. One of those excessive assumptions is that 
the initial boundary lines can be deciphered. Further, since an 
international entity created the problem, we would also need an 
international organization to fix the problem.  
The problem, though, to illustrate with the doctrine of flux (i.e., 
“everything flows”) is that everything changes and nothing stands 
still.192 As the Ionian philosopher, Heraclitus (535-475 B.C.) famously 
stated, “[n]o man ever steps in the same river twice, for it’s not 
the same river and he’s not the same man.”193 As a corollary, there is 
no consensus yet, and it is not clear whether there will ever be a 
consensus, on the grand solution involving a redrawing of the 
continent’s many artificial boundaries. Some states present today in the 
African landscape did not exist in precolonial Africa;194 neither Senegal 
nor Gambia featured in the precolonial map of Africa.195 The same is 
true of a state like Nigeria, which did not exist in pre-colonial Africa 
but whose territory encompasses three major ethnic groups, namely, 
Igbo, Hausa-Fulani, and Yoruba, each numerous enough to form an 
independent country.196   
                                                          
192.  See Tim Rayner, Heraclitus, Change, and Flow, PHIL. FOR CHANGE (Apr. 
7, 2008), https://philosophyforchange.wordpress.com/2008/04/07/heraclitus-on-
change/.  
193.  Socrates, Heraclitus (535-475 BCE), CLASSICAL WISDOM WEEKLY (July 
17, 2013), http://classicalwisdom.com/heraclitus-535-475-bce/.  
194. See A Complete Map of Africa, MAPS ETC., 
http://etc.usf.edu/maps/galleries/africa/complete/index.php?pageNum_Recordset1=0
&totalRows_Recordset1=86 (last visited Mar. 6, 2017) (gallery of 86 maps of Africa, 
including snapshots of precolonial period).  
195. Id.  
196. Philip C. Aka, Human Rights as Conflict Resolution in Africa in the New 
Century, 11 TULSA J. COMP. & INT’L L. 179, 203–05 (2003).  
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B.  Political Engineering is Necessary, But Not Sufficient 
A second lesson emanating from the case study of the Senegambia 
Confederation is that political engineering is necessary for robust 
development. As defined here, political engineering is constitutional 
engineering, including innovative political structure, and robust 
participation in economic integration. We take a close look at each of 
these elements, using the relations between Gambia and Senegal as an 
example where necessary.  
Constitutional engineering is the process wherein political actors 
devise a “higher law,” usually embodied in a written document, notably 
a constitution.197 It includes elements such as power sharing and 
devolution and cleaner (or less corrupt) governments, whether or not 
these techniques are enshrined in a charter document.198 Constitutional 
engineering calls to mind the advice of President Barack Obama in a 
speech he gave to the Ghanaian lawmakers and people during a state 
visit to the country in July of 2009, to the effect that Africa “needs 
strong institutions,” not strongmen.199 These institutions, he said, 
include strong parliaments, honest police forces, independent 
judiciaries, independent presses, assertive civil society, and a vibrant 
private sector.200 Without these institutions, it is hard to engage in the 
                                                          
197. ZACHARY ELKINS, Constitutional Engineering, in INTERNATIONAL 
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF POLITICAL SCIENCE (Bertrand Badie et al. eds., 2016), 
http://sk.sagepub.com/reference/intlpoliticalscience/n101.xml. The term engineering 
is instructive because engineers are workers who use scientific techniques to design, 
create, or build structures such as roads and bridges. See Engineering, MERRIAM-
WEBSTER, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/engineering (last visited 
Mar. 6, 2017). 
198. On this point, the United States comes to mind, where the judiciary helps 
to create constitutional law through its rulings. See, e.g., Cornell Univ. Law Sch., 
Constitutional Law: An Overview LEGAL INFO. INST., 
https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/constitutional_law (last visited Mar. 6, 2017) 
(positing that because the Supreme Court of the United States plays “a crucial role in 
interpreting the Constitution[,]” constitutional law study within the U.S. “focuses 
heavily on Supreme Court rulings.”).  
199. Obama, supra note 1.  
200. Id.  
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nation-building necessary to complete African countries’ emergence 
from foreign control.201  
In the period since independence, Senegal and Gambia have 
unveiled several measures of constitutional engineering, designed to 
bring about the governance structure they need to realize 
development.202 Since 1962, Senegal introduced several amendments 
to its independence constitution, including the 2001 referendum that 
culminated in the current constitution.203 Gambia has done pretty much 
the same, both under Dawda Jawara’s era and in the period since 1994 
under Yahya Jammeh, until his departure from office in January of 
2017.204 However, none of these measures of political reform went far 
enough. 
One indicator for Senegal is the unresolved nation-building trouble 
in the Casamance,205 while for Gambia, scarcely improved living 
conditions from the Jawara era have been worsened by human rights 
abuses under Jammeh since 1994.206 Still on Gambia, although 
recognized at home and abroad as a responsible leader who respected 
                                                          
201. Id. (“[J]ust as it is important to emerge from the control of other nations, it 
is even more important to build one’s own nation.”).  
202. See generally Int’l Inst. for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, 
Constitutional History of Senegal, CONSTITUTION NET, 
http://www.constitutionnet.org/country/constitutional-history-senegal (last visited 
Mar. 6, 2017) (referencing Senegal); JAMMEH, supra note 78, passim.  
203. See Int’l Inst. for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, supra note 202.  
204. See JAMMEH, supra note 78, at 20–36 and 37–59 (dealing, respectively, 
with the First Republican Constitution 1970-94, and Second Republican Constitution 
since 1997). 
205. See Tomas Serna, Senegal’s Southern Conflict: Forgotten but Not Gone, 
INSIGHT ON CONFLICT (Sept. 6, 2016), https://www.insightonconflict.org/ 
blog/2016/09/senegals-southern-conflict-forgotten-not-gone/.  
206. See, e.g., Gambia, World Report 2016, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, 
https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/gambia.pdf (last visited Mar. 6, 2017); 
Gambia 2015/2016, AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, https://www.amnesty.org/ 
en/countries/africa/gambia/report-gambia; Jeffrey Smith & Maggie Dwyer, Gambia’s 
President is under Pressure to Step Down. Is It Time for a Change?, WASHINGTON 
POST (May 17, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-
cage/wp/2016/05/17/gambian-president-jammeh-is-under-pressure-to-step-down-is-
it-time-for-a-regime-change/; The Gambia under Yahya Jammeh: 22 Years of 
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the human rights of his citizens, Jawara was noted for his limited access 
to public services, including access to water.207 In contrast, Jammeh, 
who is notorious for unpredictability and repressive leadership, 
promoted neither human rights nor better access to public services.208 
On December 2, 2016, after 22 years in office, the Jammeh era finally 
came to an end when the Gambian dictator lost the presidential election 
to Adama Barrow, candidate of a coalition of seven parties that ran 
against him.209 
The examination of political structure as part of political 
engineering requires a discussion of whether a confederation was the 
proper tool for deepening relations between Senegal and Gambia in the 
1980s. Three mutually-exclusive possibilities exist universally 
regarding division of governmental powers in any political system, 
namely: unitarism, federalism, and confederalism.210 Under unitarism, 
ultimate governmental authority rests in the hands of the national or 
central government.211 In this system, responsibility for even local 
matters, such as education, law enforcement, and land use, is lodged in 
the national government.212 Like most states in Africa, both Senegal and 
Gambia operate under a unitary system of government.213  
Confederalism is the direct opposite of unitarism.214 Ultimate 
governmental authority in this system rests in the hands of non-central 
entities,215 such as provinces, cantons, or states. A good example would 
                                                          
207. Smith & Dwyer, supra note 206. As a matter of fact, protest over this basic 
amenity led to violent clashes with the police weeks before the July 1994 coup which 
ended Jawara’s period in office. Id.  
208. See id.  
209. See Gambia’s Yahya Jammeh Loses Election to Adama Barrow, supra note 
80.  
210. See STEFFEN W. SCHMIDT ET AL., AMERICAN GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS 
TODAY 81–82 (12th ed. 2004) (brief overview of all three systems); Nation and States: 
Systems of Government, SPARKNOTES, http://www.sparknotes.com/us-government-
and-politics/political-science/nations-and-states/section4.rhtml (last visited Mar. 6, 
2017). 
211.  SCHMIDT ET AL., supra note 210, at 82.  
212. Id.  
213. See Political Handbook of the World 2014, CQ PRESS, 
http://library.cqpress.com/phw/toc.php?source=Political+Handbook+of+the+World
+2014&mode=phw-govtype (last visited Mar. 17, 2017). 
214. See SCHMIDT ET AL., supra note 210, at 82.  
215. Id.  
38
California Western International Law Journal, Vol. 47, No. 2 [2017], Art. 6
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwilj/vol47/iss2/6
AkaCameraReady final (Do Not Delete) 7/5/2017  10:05 AM 
2017] THE SENEGAMBIA CONFEDERATION 147 
be the United States under the Articles of Confederation from 1781-
89.216 Under this system, rather than operate with direct control, the 
central government must act through the non-centers and “handles only 
those matters of common concern expressly delegated to it by the” non-
centers.217 Today, independent organizations seeking to achieve a 
limited purpose, such as military alliance or multinational peacekeeping  
engagements (i.e., the North Atlantic Treaty Organization or even the 
United Nations) use this formula.218 The point is that because of its 
loose nature vis-à-vis other techniques of power division and 
devolution, few real states today use this model.219  
Federalism marks a middle ground in-between the “polarities” of 
unitarism and confederalism. Compared to a unitary system where the 
central government rules supreme, in  federalism each level of 
government is supreme in the sphere of authority granted to it by a 
written constitution, and each can “act directly on the people through 
laws and through the actions of elected and appointed governmental 
officials.”220 The fact that few countries in Africa have a federalist 
system of government testifies to the scarcity of power devolution in 
the region.221 Yet worse, due to fear of “instability,” many of the few 
nominally federal states in the region, such as Nigeria, operate their 
governments in a unitary format.222   
Given the facts above, federalism, rather than confederalism, 
presented a better system of government for the unification of Gambia 
and Senegal. In short, given its unworkability, a confederation was 
probably not the most appropriate option for expanding the 
                                                          
216. Nation and States: Systems of Government, supra note 210.  
217. SCHMIDT ET AL., supra note 210, at 82.  
218. See id.  
219. See Disadvantages of a Confederation, VIRTUAL KOLLAGE, 
http://virtualkollage.blogspot.com/2016/05/disadvantages-of-confederation.html 
(last visited Mar. 17, 2017) (outlining the disadvantages of a confederal system of 
government). 
220.  SCHMIDT ET AL., supra note 210, at 82.  
221. See Political Handbook of the World 2014, supra note 213 (listing about a 
dozen African countries as federal systems, including Ethiopia, Nigeria, and South 
Africa). See also JACKSON & ROSBERG, supra note 17, at 6 (discussing probing factors 
that account for the “lack of sympathy for federalism” in Africa). 
222. See Philip C. Aka, Bridging the Gap Between Theory and Practice in 
Humanitarian Action: Eight Steps to Humanitarian Wellness in Nigeria, 24 
WILLIAMETTE J. INT’L L. & DISPUTE RESOLUTION 1, 24–31 (2016).  
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longstanding relations between the two countries to their mutual 
political and economic benefits.   
Finally, we examine robust participation in economic integration as 
part of political engineering. ECOWAS is one of eight regional 
economic communities in Africa recognized by the African Union, the 
association of independent states in Africa that, in 2002, replaced the 
Organization of African Unity.223  Both Gambia and Senegal are 
founding members of the economic community.224 Additionally, 
Gambia is a member of Communauté des Etats Sahélo-Sahariens 
(CEN-SAD).225 Formed in February 1983, the organization consists of 
28 member countries.226 Quantity is not the only measure of the depth 
of commitment to economic integration; quality also counts. This 
wisdom mandates an examination of cultural engineering as the next 
sub-issue in this discussion.  
C.  Cultural Engineering is Necessary to Complement Political 
Engineering 
Optimum results in (economic) development necessitate coupling 
of political and cultural engineering.227 Cultural engineering is a 
product of attitudinal changes. A key concept of comparative politics 
that cultural engineering evokes is political culture, defined as basic 
attitudes about political life that are widely shared within a particular 
                                                          
223. See supra note 126 and accompanying text.  
224. See supra note 10. 
225. CEN-SAD Celebrates 13th Anniversary, PANAPRESS (Feb. 4, 2011), 
http://www.panapress.com/CEN-SAD-celebrates-13th-anniversary—-12-756752-
29-lang2-index.html.  
226. See id. The members include: Benin, Burkina Faso, Central African 
Republic, Chad, Comoros, Côte d’Ivoire, Djibouti, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, 
Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Libya, Liberia, Mali, Morocco, Niger, 
Nigeria, Sao Tomé & Principe, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Togo, and 
Tunisia. Id.  
227. See Ali A. Mazrui, Constitutional Change and Cultural Engineering, in 
CONSTITUTIONALISM IN AFRICA: CREATING OPPORTUNITIES, FACING CHALLENGES 
19–26 (J. Oloka-Onyango ed., 2001). Mazrui comments on the relationship between 
constitutional engineering and cultural engineering. He contends that for restructuring 
to take place in Africa—what he calls Afrostroika, a parody of perestroika (or political 
restructuring in the Soviet Union under Mikhail Gorbachev)—cultural engineering 
needs to take place alongside constitutional engineering. Id.  
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community.228 Depending on the society in question, these shared 
attitudes may include broadly diffused core political values—whether 
shaped by secular or religious ideologies— that are divisible into three 
clusters, namely: (1) attitudes toward authority, (2) attitudes toward 
society, and (3) attitudes toward politics, especially the state.229  In 
matured democracies like the United States, these features of cultural 
engineering include institutional elements of democracy, measured as 
indicators of progress toward the ideals of democracy.230 These 
necessary elements include freedom and equality,231 as well as a 
commitment by the government to preserve these rights for all without 
discrimination;232 respect of minority rights;233 a system for popular 
participation enabling private interest groups to “to meet, organize, plan 
strategy, and lobby government for action” without fear of reprisal;234 
an independent judiciary that uses its authority to enforce the rule of 
law;235 and a cultural commitment to democratic ideals among all levels 
of society, evident in shared ideals that include reverence for the 
Constitution, pursuit of freedom and equality, respect of minority 
rights, and fidelity to the rule of law.236 Development itself, a key term 
in this study, also entails—and mandates—attitudinal changes. As 
opposed to mere promise or assertion of change, development is a “big 
cultural” moment requiring a complex process that entails changes “in 
people’s minds as well.”237  
Why political engineering by itself, no matter how creative, is not 
enough, making attitudes imperative is because, as Professor Donald L. 
Horowitz pointed out, those charged with responsibility for 
implementing designs “may wish to alter the design to favor 
                                                          
228. See, e.g., SODARO, supra note 44, at 293.   
229. Id. at 294–95, 300–04.  
230. See LARRY BERMAN & BRUCE ALLEN MURPHY, APPROACHING 
DEMOCRACY 11-16 (8th ed. 2013).  
231.  Id. at 8–9.  
232.  Id. at 14.  
233.  Id. at 9–10.  
234.  Id. at 13.  
235.  Id. at 14–15.  
236.  Id. at 16.  
237.  DAVIDSON, supra note 9, at 225.  
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themselves.”238 To be sure, “it is possible to build in safeguards or 
tripwires that make alterations difficult or set off alarms when attempts 
are made.”239 The downside though is “the looser the design and the 
easier the adoption, the easier the alteration as well.”240  
Recall President Obama’s speech in 2009 to the Ghanaian 
lawmakers and people.241 Obama observed that history is on the side of 
people who follow the rule of law, rather than the rule of big men who 
“use coups or change constitutions to stay in power.”242 Cultural 
engineering is the work of citizens—governors and the governed 
alike—engaged in the daunting yet necessary work of conscientiously 
building their own nations. This work, necessary to achieve political 
and economic development, is guided by the rule of law, rather than the 
rule of big men.243  
Nigeria, several countries away from Senegambia and a founding 
member of ECOWAS, is a good example of what happens where a 
plenitude of political reforms on paper are unaccompanied by 
attitudinal changes anchored in the rule of law. Beginning with 
preparations for its Second Republic in 1979, and in-between military 
and civilian regimes until the present day, the country has unveiled 
numerous measures of political reforms, including the adoption of new 
constitutions.244 Yet, judged by the scandal of corruption and abuse of 
                                                          
238.  Donald L. Horowitz, Constitutional Design: Proposals Versus Processes 
32 (Dec. 9-11, 1999) (unpublished paper prepared for conference at University of 
Notre Dame), http://www3.nd.edu/~kellogg/faculty/research/pdfs/Horowitz.pdf.  
239. Id.  
240. Id.  
241. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.  
242. Obama, supra note 1. 
243. See John Mukum Mbaku, The Rule of Law and Poverty Eradication in 
Africa, 13 J. AFRICAN & ASIAN STUD. 530, 533 (2014); and, John M. 
Mbaku, Providing a Foundation for Wealth Creation and Development in Africa: The 
Role and Rule of Law, 38 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 959 (2013), for a chronicle of the positive 
influence of the rule of law on economic development.  
244. See, e.g., LARRY DIAMOND, Nigeria: Pluralism, Statism, and the Struggle 
for Democracy, in 2 DEMOCRACY IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: AFRICA 45–49  (Larry 
Diamond et al. eds.,1988) (chronicling “[t]he transition to the Second Republic”); 
Jayson S. Myers, A Commitment to Reform: The Constitution and Politics of 
Nigeria’s Second Civilian Regime (July 1982) (unpublished M.A. Thesis, University 
of British Columbia) (focusing on the Second Republic from 1979 to 1983); Ignatius 
Akaayar Ayua & Dakas C.J. Dakas, Federal Republic of Nigeria, in CONSTITUTIONAL 
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power among elites in the land,245 joined by pervasive scam artistry 
among the citizenry,246 the country still has a long way to go to 
implement the attitudinal changes necessary to internalize political 
engineering.247   
Little evidence from the case study suggests that individually 
(domestically) or jointly (i.e. in relations with each other) Senegal and 
Gambia have accumulated the right quantum of cultural engineering 
that, with other requisite elements, translates into an optimum structure 
for economic development. The two states were unable to fashion a 
mutually satisfactory common ground sufficient to satisfy concerns of 
national security and save their political experiment.248 The same 
inability to reach common grounds was also evident in economic 
integration. The requisite commitment should include a search for 
common ground that promotes interregional trade as opposed to 
repeated pursuit of advantages inconsistent with the good of the whole. 
Instead, like other member-states of ECOWAS, both countries 
exhibited lax commitment to economic integration, evident in missed 
targets, as well as a lack of sound and credible policies domestically to 
drive economic integration that bedevil ECOWAS and other regional 
economic communities in Africa.249 No issue portrays this lax 
                                                          
ORIGINS, STRUCTURE, AND CHANGE IN FEDERAL COUNTRIES 239 (John Kincaid & 
George Alan Tarr eds., 2005) (covering all four Republics of the country).  
245. See DANIEL JORDAN SMITH, A CULTURE OF CORRUPTION: EVERYDAY 
DECEPTION AND POPULAR DISCONTENT IN NIGERIA (2008) (chronicling the 
widespread nature of corruption in the daily lives of many Nigerians, many of which 
are perpetrated by government officials, including police and other security 
personnel).  
246. See Erika Eichelberger, What I Learned Hanging Out with Nigerian Email 
Scammers, MOTHER JONES (Mar. 20, 2014, 5:00 AM), 
http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2014/03/what-i-learned-from-nigerian-
scammers.  
247. See ROTIMI T. SUBERU, Institutions, Political Culture, and 
Constitutionalism in Nigeria, in POLITICAL CULTURE AND CONSTITUTIONALISM: A 
COMPARATIVE APPROACH 197 (Daniel P. Franklin & Michael J. Baun eds., 1995).  
248. See supra notes 169–73 and accompanying text. 
249. See Aka, supra note 196, at 194–96. Evolution of regional integration in 
Africa usually means progress from a free trade area to a customs union (an advanced 
form of free trade area that can include consummation of a common external tariff on 
countries outside the zone) and beyond to eventual political union. Hartzenberg, supra 
note 10, at 2 n.1. No African regional community has accomplished this full evolution 
due to missed targets.  
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commitment like the fact that, as members of a key customs union 
within their sub-region with the mission of a common regional 
currency,250 Senegal and Gambia remained steadfastly glued to 
currencies tied to the monetary regimes of their former colonial 
overlords.251   
D.  Political Performance is Necessary to Crown the Twin Factors of 
Political Engineering and Cultural Engineering 
The fourth teachable lesson from the case study on the failure of 
the Senegambia Confederation relates to political performance. In the 
sense that it is used here, the term refers to how well politicians, whether 
elected or appointed, serve their countries.252 In the search for an 
appropriate structure to conduct development, good leadership 
embedded in political performance provides a critical glue that activates 
political engineering and cultural engineering, without which they 
remain inanimate.253  
Scholars have devised various clusters of governmental activities 
to measure political performance.254 One such cluster involves the 
formulation and implementation of socioeconomic policies designed to 
achieve economic development necessary to improve the living 
standards of residents.255 Another, political stability, presents itself 
when the government forges the kind of unity that creates an orderly 
and predictable political environment that protects residents against the 
threat of serious domestic turmoil.256 Third and final is the guarantee of 
                                                          
250. See, e.g., Common West African Currency: Eco in 2015, MODERN GHANA 
(May 29, 2009), https://www.modernghana.com/news/219137/1/common-west-
africa-currency-eco-in-2015.html.  
251. See supra note 165 and accompanying text.  
252. ROLF H.W. THEEN & FRANK L. WILSON, COMPARATIVE POLITICS: AN 
INTRODUCTION TO SEVEN COUNTRIES 20 (3d ed. 1996).  
253. A political structure, no matter how creatively designed, is only as good as 
the men and women who run it. Leaders are distinguished from mere power holders. 
Instead, they are office holders capable of producing social change that will satisfy 
the authentic yearnings of their followers. See JAMES MACGREGOR BURNS, 
LEADERSHIP 4–5 (1978).  
254. See THEEN & WILSON, supra note 252, at 20–21.  
255. Id. at 20.  
256. Id. at 21.  
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human rights:257 basic guarantees of a political, economic, social and 
cultural nature, which human beings everywhere need to lead a 
complete and fulfilled life.258   
Although human rights may not appear critical to the survival of a 
nation, they are extremely important.259 As Professors Theen and 
Wilson point out, “[a]ll member states of the United Nations have 
accepted the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which obligates 
them to” guarantee for their citizens a range of basic human rights.260 
These rights include “freedom from racial, religious, or sex 
discrimination; the right to a fair trial; freedom of thought, conscience, 
and religion; freedom of peaceful assembly and association; freedom to 
hold opinions, to seek, receive, and impart ideas and information; the 
right to elect leaders through universal suffrage; the right to work with 
free choice of employment; [and] the right to education[,]” among 
others.261 In short, the obligation to promote human rights evaluates the 
ability of national leaders to “meet[] these pledges, keeping in mind the 
differing levels of political development and the different concepts of 
freedom.”262   
Two of various possible composite indicators that could be said to 
sum up all measures of political performance, would be per capita 
income, and the percentage of the population who live below poverty 
line. The first indicates the ability of a government to generate the 
                                                          
257. Id.   
258. See Kenneth Roth, Human Rights Organization: A New Force for Social 
Change, in REALIZING HUMAN RIGHTS: MOVING FROM INSPIRATION TO IMPACT 225, 
230–31 (Samantha Power & Graham Allison, eds., 2000) (commenting on the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted by the United Nations General 
Assembly in 1948).  
259. See THEEN & WILSON, supra note 252, at 21. Professors Theen and Wilson 
noted that, compared to the other two indices for measuring political performance, 
evaluating human rights “is more controversial.” Id. Partly for this reason, they came 
to the middle ground that “[a]s evaluations of the state of human rights are made, we 
need to be aware that [developing] countries that are experiencing social change, or 
that are seeking a way to integrate hostile social or ethnic groups, may well choose to 
delay the implementation of full liberties until the crises of modernization or 
integration are past.” Id.  
260. Id.  
261. Id.  
262. Id.  
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wealth individual citizens need to satisfy their economic well-being.263 
The second, defined universally in terms of the number of individuals 
who live on less than $1.25 USD a day for low-income countries, 
speaks to the ability of a government to alleviate extreme poverty.264 
Like many African governments, Senegal and Gambia could do better 
on political performance, within the limits of their lean material 
resources, to the material glory of their longsuffering citizens. In 
Senegal, gross domestic product (GDP) per capita averaged 
approximately $940 USD from 1960 until 2015.265 Senegal’s per capita 
income “reach[ed] an all-time high of $1091 USD in 1961 and a record 
low of $793 USD in 1994.”266 In Gambia, GDP per capita income 
averaged $511 USD from 1966 until 2015.267 Per capita income 
“reach[ed] an all-time high of $562 USD in 2010 and a record low of 
little over $414 USD in 1967.”268 As of 2015, after over half-century of 
independence, both countries ranked within the classification of low-
income states (GDP of  $1,025 or less USD per capita) as specified by 
the World Bank.269 Nearly 50 percent of the population in both 
countries still live below the poverty line.270 The only flicker of good 
news that tempers the otherwise difficult economic story is that, based 
                                                          
263. See, e.g., J. TYLER DICKOVICK & JONATHAN EASTWOOD, COMPARATIVE 
POLITICS: INTEGRATING THEORIES, METHODS, AND CASES 82 (2013).  
264. See, e.g., Press Release, New Data Show 1.4 Billion Live on Less Than US 
$1.25 a Day, But Progress Against Poverty Remains Strong, WORLD BANK (Aug. 16, 
2008), http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2008/09/16/new-data-show-
14-billion-live-less-us125-day-progress-against-poverty-remains-strong. 
265. Senegal GDP Per Capita 1960-2016, TRADING ECONS., 
www.tradingeconomics.com/senegal/gdp-per-capita.   
266.  Id.  
267. Gambia GDP Per Capita 1966-2016, TRADING ECONS., 
www.tradingeconomics.com/gambia/gdp-per-capita. 
268. Id.  
269. World Bank Country and Lending Group: Country Classification, DATA 
HELP DESK, https://datahelpdesk.worldbank.org/knowledgebase/articles/906519-
world-bank-country-and-lending-groups (last visited Mar. 14, 2017).  
270. See Senegal, THE WORLD FACTBOOK, supra note 37; Gambia, THE WORLD 
FACTBOOK, supra note 69. See also Matthew Evans Teti, Gambia, in ENCYCLOPEDIA 
OF WORLD POVERTY 414 (Mehmet Odekon, ed., 2006) (disclosing that in 2005, over 
sixty percent of Gambians lived below the poverty line, with poverty concentrated 
largely in rural regions and the eastern half of the country, especially among women).  
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on recent International Monetary Fund’s global economic outlook data, 
Senegal ranks among the ten fastest-growing economies in Africa.271  
V. CONCLUSION 
Africa’s artificial boundaries inherited from European imperialism 
will have to be redrawn to make room for viable nation-states that will 
form the vehicle for economic development in the 21st century. For the 
best result, the task must be performed by an international organization, 
such as the African Union:272 the same route through which the artificial 
boundaries were constructed in the first place. The difference is that this 
time, Africans will redraw the boundaries themselves. Such a large 
undertaking requires consensus, which is unlikely to be found anytime 
soon. Even if consensus was attained, boundaries must be redrawn with 
the consideration that everything is constantly in flux. Until the time 
such consensus occurs, we must realistically settle with less grand 
measures.  
Such midrange strategies, elicited from a case study of the 
Senegambia Confederation tracking the locust years of African 
economic development during the lost years of the 1980s, comprise the 
solutions of political engineering, cultural engineering, and political 
performance. It is hard to minimize the impediment that Africa’s 
artificial boundaries pose to good governance and development. 
However, midrange strategies set the groundwork for grand solutions 
like redrawing artificial boundaries.273  
Not only does the Senegambia Confederation elicit midrange 
strategies germane for the conduct of African political and economic 
development, it also stands out as the boldest application yet of these 
strategies since the unsuccessful union attempt of 1959 involving 
Ghana, Guinea, and Mali.274 This Article presents an answer as to why 
                                                          
271. See Joe Myers, Which Are Africa’s Fastest-Growing Economies?, WORLD 
ECON. FORUM (Apr. 19, 2016), https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2016/04/which-
are-africa-s-fastest-growing-economies/.  
272. See Aka, supra note 196, at 201–05.  
273. See Jackson & Rosberg, supra note 17, at 5 (noting that “public attitudes 
and behavior” reflected in “the social and political boundaries between” ethnic groups 
in Africa whose homelands straddle two or more countries may be “more significant” 
than the physical boundaries dividing the countries).  
274.  See supra notes 178–79.  
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the political experiment failed. The explanation focused on three 
teachable lessons from that failure: the appropriate structure necessary 
for robust development in Africa, broadly defined, requires (1) political 
engineering and (2) cultural engineering with (3) political performance. 
The right mix of these goods will depend on the particular country or, 
as with the Senegambia Confederation that formed the case study here, 
the set of countries involved. The relative stability in Senegambia, 
particularly with respect to Senegal, one of the few countries in Africa 
yet to experience a military takeover of power, obscures broader issues 
bearing on appropriate structure for development that the failure of the 
ill-fated union between Senegal and Gambia brought to the fore.  
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